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The recent advent of the third edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders represented a major 
shift from a monothetic to a polythetic system for the 
categorization of psychopathology. Accompanying this shift 
has been an increased interest in the prototype model of 
categorization, particularly with respect to the personality 
disorders. Despite this heightened interest in alternative 
models of psychiatric nosology, little is known about the 
precise factors that determine the diagnostic process. The 
present study examined three factors that have been suggested 
to be important determinants of personality disorder diagnoses 
within the prototype model of categorization. These factors 
included the number of features representative of a 
personality disorder category, the extent to which those 
features are typical of the category, and the "dominance" or 
proportion of category features to the total number of 
features. A series of personality profiles was constructed 
in which the above factors were varied factorially. Thirty-
two practicing doctoral-level clinical psychologists read 12 
profiles of hypothetical clients, and provided ratings of how 
prototypical each client was of each of the 11 DSM-III 
personality disorders. Subjects also selected one diagnosis 
that best categorized the profile. The results revealed 
strong main effects for the factors of typicality and 
dominance, and limited effects for category feature number. 
Profiles containing features that were more typical of a given 
personality disorder resulted in higher prototypicality 
ratings of that category and an increased likelihood of a 
"correct" diagnosis. Similarly, profiles containing a high 
proportion of category features relative to the total number 
of features resulted in higher prototypicality ratings and 
increased diagnostic accuracy relative to low-dominance 
profiles. Although in the predicted direction, the effects 
of category feature number were weaker than predicted. The 
results support the utility of conceptualizing personality 
disorders within a prototype framework, and hold important 
implications for future revisions of nosologies of 
psychopathology. In particular, it is argued that greater 
attention should be given to differences in typicality of 
criterion features of the personality disorders, as well as 
to the issue of dominance in the assessment process. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The ability to discriminate phenomena and to "re­
present" them in categories is fundamental to effective 
behavior with respect to those phenomena. "Whenever we 
perform any kind of action, say something as mundane as 
writing with a pencil, hammering with a hammer or ironing 
clothes, we are using categories. The particular action we 
perform on that occasion is a kind of motor activity (e.g., 
writing, hammering, ironing), that is, it is in a particular 
category of motor actions. They are never done in exactly 
the same way, yet despite the differences in particular 
movements, they are all movements of a kind..." (Lakoff, 1987, 
p. 6) . 
From a behavioral perspective, such categories of actions 
are response classes that are consistently differentially 
reinforced when performed in the presence of particular 
discriminative stimuli. The specific responses may never have 
exactly the same topography, yet, functionally, they are all 
members of the same response class. Behaviorists make a 
further distinction between responding differentially to 
discriminative stimuli and verbally categorizing different 
stimuli. For example, pigeons can learn to respond 
differentially to different colored response keys, but one 
would not say that they have developed a verbal categorization 
system for colors. Verbal specifications of stimuli are not 
absolutely necessary for effective behavior with respect to 
those stimuli. Yet verbal specifications of stimuli can be 
useful in sharpening stimulus control by increasing the 
probability of differential responding to those stimuli. 
The Functions of Category Labels 
Verbal specifications of stimulus categories are 
necessary for the development of accurate descriptions of 
natural phenomena. Radical Behaviorism holds that verbal 
behavior helps sharpen stimulus control by allowing for the 
specification and construction of discriminative stimuli and 
contingencies of reinforcement (Skinner, 1969). The act of 
verbally specifying stimulus categories, such as the color 
"red," objects that are "hammers," or "histrionic" behavior, 
is called a "tacting" (Skinner, 1969, p. 81). The verbal 
response of tacting the color "red," for example, is evoked 
by the stimulus property of a particular range of wavelength 
of light (Skinner, 1969). A parent's differential 
reinforcement for the child's tacting of the color "red," the 
object "hammer," or other stimulus categories increases the 
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probability that the child will readily respond differentially 
to those stimulus categories (Herrnstein, 1982). 
Thus, the accurate specification or labeling of stimulus 
categories increases the probability that those listening will 
respond effectively with respect to those categories. 
"Similarly, when a speaker intraverbally reconstructs 
directions, rules of conduct, and 'laws of thought,' he 
increases the likelihood of successful practical, ethical, and 
intellectual behavior, respectively, and his success in doing 
so depends upon the 'purity' of the controlling relations" 
(Skinner, 1957, p. 418). Furthermore, explicit classification 
systems sharpen the discriminative control of verbal responses 
to related groups of stimuli (Skinner, 1957). For example, 
the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987) serves as a classification system that 
helps psychodiagnosticians classify related groups of clinical 
behaviors into diagnostic categories, thereby facilitating 
effective behavior with respect to those phenomena. 
From a cognitive perspective, category labels facilitate 
learning and recall. Labels of categories allow a large 
amount of related information to be organized hierarchically 
into a limited number of memory chunks (Bower & Hilgard, 1981; 
Tulving & Donaldson, 1972). Attribution theory stresses the 
importance of category labels in helping people predict and 
control their social environment (Yarkin, Harvey & Bloxum, 
1981). A label about a person may indicate to others which 
behaviors would probably be most effective in interacting with 
that person, based upon their interactions with similar 
persons in the past. Each perspective on the utility of 
category labels emphasizes the increased effectiveness of 
behavior as the result of effective categorization. Of 
particular interest to the present study are psychodiagnostic 
classification systems, which may be viewed as verbal 
specifications of certain categories of behavioral phenomena 
that are intended to enhance the effectiveness of assessment 
and treatment of these phenomena. 
The Classical View of Categorization 
Much attention within the fields of cognitive and 
clinical psychology has recently been devoted to contrasting 
"prototype" categorization with "classical" categorization. 
The roots of the "classical" model of categorization are 
somewhat difficult to trace because the currently popular 
literature on the prototype model cites few proponents of the 
classical model. 
The 17th century physician, Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689) 
has been credited as the founder of modern medical nosology 
(Dewhurst, 1966; Temkin, 1965). The roots of the classical 
model of categorization can be found in Sydenham's writings 
(Dewhurst, 1966) . Rather than recommend the virtually useless 
theoretical medical books of the 1600's, he suggested that 
physicians read Don Quixote as an text on the skills and 
merits of empirical observation. He asserted that the species 
and genera of diseases should be distinguished upon the basis 
of purely empirical observation of a constant set of necessary 
and sufficient symptoms existing in each member of a given 
class, rather than upon etiological theories (Dewhurst, 1965; 
Temkin, 1965). 
Directly following from Sydenham's emphasis upon a set 
of necessary and sufficient criteria for category membership, 
Baissier de Sauvage (1790) developed a classification system 
of diseases consisting of ten classes, each with successive 
orders and genera. Note that Sydenham's requirement that 
classification systems be based upon a set of necessary and 
sufficient criteria is now simply referred to in the current 
prototype literature as the classical or "monothetic" model 
of categorization. The proponents of the prototype model may 
be quite surprised to learn, however, that even as the founder 
of the monothetic model of medical nosology, Sydenham strongly 
emphasized the importance of considering heterogeneity within 
classes of disease. Comparing himself to a botanist, he 
stated, "that botanist would have but little conscience who 
contented himself with a general description of a thistle and 
overlooked the special and peculiar characteristics in each 
species" (Dewhurst, 1966). 
Application of the classical model of categorization was 
refined in the hierarchical classification system of the 
Swedish naturalist, Carolus Linnaeus (1701-1778). This 
taxonomic system specified a list of necessary and sufficient 
criteria for category membership. For example, the class of 
Mammalia is defined by the following necessary and sufficient 
criteria: "young nourished by milk glands, skin with hair or 
fur, body cavity divided by diaphragm, red corpuscles without 
nuclei, and high body temperature" (Curtis, 1979, p. 346). 
The classical model was used as the basis of Charles 
Fourier's classification system of personality types, 
developed in the early 1800's. Beginning with three basic 
"passions,11 he then divided each of them into 12 orders, 12 
genera, 134 species, and 404 varieties, making for a total of 
810 character types (Allport, 1937). 
The classical model has also been called the "monothetic" 
approach to categorization (Hempel, 1965; Schwartz & Wiggins, 
1987) . According to the monothetic model, category membership 
is determined by the presence or absence of a set of necessary 
and sufficient criteria. Thus, an entire set of criteria is 
necessary for category membership in that no criteria can be 
missing. The set of criteria is also sufficient to acquire 
category membership in that no additional criteria need be 
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fulfilled. Although at face value the monothetic model 
appears to be very useful, it is based upon several 
assumptions that are quite problematic. If all members of a 
classical category possess the same set of necessary and 
sufficient criteria, it follows that all category members are 
equally good, representative instances of the category. 
Moreover, all category members are equally poor, 
unrepresentative examples of other categories. Despite 
Sydenham's emphasis upon the importance of considering the 
heterogeneity within members of the same class, a weakness of 
the monothetic model is that it does not account for different 
degrees of heterogeneity that exist between members of the 
same category. For example, within the monothetic class of 
Mammalia, a greater degree of heterogeneity exists between 
felines and whales than does between felines and canines. 
Given its requirement of a constant set of necessary and 
sufficient criteria for category membership, the monothetic 
model of classification appears to be based on the assumption 
that the determination of category membership is very 
clear-cut, with homogeneity within categories, clearly 
demarcated boundaries of categories, and heterogeneity between 
categories. It would follow from this model that natural 
phenomena exist in a pure, homogeneous form, as if they had 
been parceled into discrete "abstract containers" (Lakoff, 
1987, p. 6). 
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Moreover, the impact of motivational influences upon the 
observer's determination of category membership is not 
addressed. According to Lakoff (1987), the classical 
monothetic model is based upon the assumption that human 
reason is most successful when it operates autonomously of 
motivational influences. This assumption holds that 
categories of phenomena are clearly demarcated and 
self-evident to those who have succeeded in isolating their 
reasoning powers from motivational influences. Lakoff (1987, 
p. 9) suggests that the classical monothetic concept of a 
category is based upon the rather egocentric assumption that 
"there is a correct, God's eye view of the world — a single 
correct way of understanding what is and what is not true." 
He argues that such ideas "need to be replaced by ideas that 
are not only more accurate, but more humane" (1987, p. 9). 
The Prototype Model of Categorization 
Whereas monothetic categories specify a list of necessary 
and sufficient criteria, polythetic categories specify a list 
of criteria, but only require a particular number of those 
criteria to be met for diagnostic inclusion. The evolution 
from the DSM-II to the DSM-III as the standard for psychiatric 
nomenclature represents a move from the monothetic approach 
to the polythetic approach. It has been suggested that a 
further move to a prototype model would be a further 
improvement (Millon, 1986). 
The revolution from the classical, monothetic model to 
the prototype model is not really as dramatic a change as is 
described in the literature. According to this literature, 
the classical view dominated psychiatric classification until 
the creation of DSM-III. Calling this approach the 
"classical" model of categorization is misleading because it 
makes the prototype view appear new and innovative relative 
to the monothetic view, when actually the roots of the 
prototype view go just as far back in history as the roots of 
the "classical" view. 
Although the prototype model is commonly presented as a 
major innovation, its roots can be traced back to the ancient 
Greek philosophers, making the term "classical" just as 
applicable to the prototype model as it is to the 
monothetic model. Within the literature on personality 
disorders, this alternative model of categorization specifies 
a prototype or an "ideal type" of a given personality style. 
"The ideal type itself may rarely be seen, but it represents 
the synthesis of many similar cases and serves as the exemplar 
against which future cases can be compared" (Francis & 
Widiger, 1986). This model of categorizing personality 
types can be traced to the "character writings" of 
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Theophrastus, a student and successor of Aristotle (Allport, 
1937; Roback; 1927). 
"The 'portraits' by Theophrastus are similar both 
in form and substance to the DSM-III diagnoses of 
character pathology, but they surpass DSM-II and 
anticipate DSM-III by being atheoretical. and 
anticipate DSM-IV by including not only a narrative 
description of the ideal type, but also a list of 
behavioral acts that typify each style (for example, 
the 'penurious' character forbids anyone to pick a 
fig from his garden, daily checks his boundary 
markers on his property, and will move furniture to 
find a lost copper)" (Frances & Widiger, 1986, p. 
242) . 
In fact this line of thought can be traced even further 
back to Aristotle's mentor, Plato. According to Plato's 
teachings, each type or class of phenomenon is represented by 
its perfect, ideal form in the world of ideas. The word 
prototype (from the Greek "prototupon," meaning first form), 
commonly denotes an original model of a phenomenon that is 
subsequently reproduced, in ways that represent significant 
modifications from the original form. It is argued that 
Plato's concept of the perfect, ideal form does not 
necessarily reflect the "classical view" that natural 
phenomena exist in pure, homogeneous forms. It is possible 
to use a prototype or ideal type as a perfect example of a 
particular category without believing that the actual members 
of the category must be perfect as well. "The relationship 
of the 'many' objects, belonging to a certain class of things 
in the sense world, to the 'One,' i.e. the single Idea which 
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is their archetype, is another great source of difficulty to 
Plato" (Bourke, 1962). One of the solutions discussed in 
Plato's dialogues is "that the many participate imperfectly 
in the perfect nature of their Idea" (Bourke, 1962). This 
classical Greek concept of a perfect form being used to 
categorize real, imperfect phenomena appears to have been 
rejuvenated in the current prototype model, as can be seen in 
the following quotations. "Prototypic categories are 
organized around prototypical examples (the best examples of 
the concept) with less prototypical examples forming a 
continuum away from these central cases" (Livesley, 1985). 
"The clinician is then able to recognize the many imperfect 
cases by their resemblance or approximation to the whole" 
(Schwartz & Wiggins, 1987). 
In more recent times, Wittgenstein (1953) has been 
credited with specifying the philosophical assumptions upon 
which the prototype model is based. Using the category of 
"games" as an example, he stated that board games, card games, 
and "ring-around-the-rosy" type games shared a particular 
"family resemblance." Yet, each instance of a game does not 
share all the category features of a game. Thus, category 
members need not all share the same set of necessary and 
sufficient criteria for membership. Rather, category members 
share variable, probabilistic family resemblances along any 
number of dimensions. 
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Whereas Wittgenstein's insights related more to family 
resemblances among objects having ordinary, prescientific 
category names, the German social scientist, Max Weber, has 
been credited with laying the foundations for a prototype 
model of scientific categorization (Jasper, 1953; Schwartz & 
Wiggins, 1987). Applying this model to historic sociology, 
Weber introduced the well-known "ideal types" of "the 
protestant ethic" and the "spirit of capitalism" in his 
analysis of individual Americans. 
Weber's approach could also be applied to the assessment 
and diagnosis of maladaptive behavior patterns. When 
confronted with an individual patient, the clinician has an 
infinite amount of varying information, which can be better 
understood when it is compared with an "ideal type." In 
Weber's words, 
"... as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way 
in which life confronts us in immediate concrete 
situations, (we realize that) it presents an 
infinite multiplicity of successively and 
coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both 
"inside" and "outside" of ourselves. The absolute 
infinity of the multiplicity is seen to remain 
undiminished even when our attention is focused on 
a single "object," ... as soon as we seriously 
attempt an exhaustive description of all the 
individual components of this "individual 
phenomenon," to say nothing of trying to explain it 
causally" (p. 72). 
According to Weber, the only way to make such information 
scientifically intelligible is to compare it against an 
"accentuation" of different perspectives that people have of 
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themselves, of others, or of other social or natural 
phenomena. This "accentuation" must be "one-sided" in its 
emphasis of particular cultural values, or particular 
scientific or practical goals, such as the promotion of mental 
health in the field of clinical psychology. 
"An ideal type is formed by the one-sided 
accentuation of one or more points of view and by 
the synthesis of a great many defuse (sic), 
discrete, more or less present, and occasionally 
absent concrete individual phenomena, which are 
arranged according to those one-sidely emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified thought-construct" (p. 
90) . 
Based upon Weber's insights, the eminent German 
philosopher and psychiatrist, Karl Jaspers, applied the 
concept of "ideal types" in his book General Psvchopathology 
(1963), the first edition of which was published in 1913. In 
his book, Jaspers draws a sharp contrast between two basic 
kinds of categories. One is the monothetic category, which 
he terms the "generic group." Note that the term generic 
commonly describes a attribute or group of attributes that is 
related to an entire class. In the field of biology, a 
generic attribute is an attribute that is common to all 
members of a Genus in the Linnaeun system of monothetic 
classification. Jaspers contrasts the "generic group" with 
the category based upon the "ideal type": 
"A case either belongs or does not belong to a 
generic group (e.g., paralysis) whereas a case only 
corresponds more or less to a type (e.g., hysterical 
personality). A generic group is the concept which 
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represents an actually existing and definable 
variant. A type is a fictitious construct which in 
reality has fluid boundaries; it serves to assess 
a particular case . .. Generic groups either exist 
or they do not. Types reveal themselves as either 
fruitful or not for the comprehension of individual 
cases ... Through the use of generic groups, real 
boundaries are established; through the use of types 
we only give structure to a transient manifold" (p. 
560) . 
Upon the basis of Jasper's work, his student and colleague, 
Kurt Schneider, developed a categorization system using ideal 
types in his book on the clinical psychopathology of 
personalities (1958). 
The current literature on the prototype model of 
categorization credits Eleanor Rosch (1973a, 1973b) for having 
revolutionized the study of categorization in experimental 
cognitive psychology with her development of "prototype 
theory." She, in turn, credits much of her work to the 
insights made by Wittgenstein. Rosch explicitly challenged 
two assumptions of the monothetic approach to categorization. 
The first assumption was that if category membership is truly 
determined only by a set of inherent properties of each 
member, then categories should exist independently of the 
peculiarities of the organisms doing the categorizing. 
Secondly, if category membership is truly determined by a set 
of necessary and sufficient properties inherent to each 
member, then all category members should be equally 
representative of the category. Rosch and others have 
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demonstrated substantial evidence (discussed below) against 
both of these implications of the monothetic theory of 
categorization. 
Rosch (1978) maintains that there are two major 
principles of prototype categorization. Both of these 
principles are based upon the notion that the categorization 
of phenomena is highly influenced by the idiosyncrasies of 
the organisms doing the categorizing. The first principle is 
that categorization functions to maintain a "cognitive 
economy" by providing "maximum information with the least 
cognitive effort" (p. 28) . Rosch elaborates that this 
principle of categorization requires that the categorizer 
strike a balance between making as many fine discriminations 
between stimuli as possible, and generalizing enough across 
those stimuli to make sense and use of them. 
"On the one hand, it would appear to the organism's 
advantage to have as many properties as possible 
predictable from knowing any one property, a 
principle that would lead to formation of large 
numbers of categories with as fine discriminations 
between categories as possible. On the other hand, 
one purpose of categorization is to reduce the 
infinite differences among stimuli to behaviorally 
and cognitively usable proportions. It is to the 
organism's advantage not to differentiate one 
stimulus from others when that differentiation is 
irrelevant to the purposes at hand" (Rosch, 1978, 
pp. 28-29). 
Rosch states that cognitive economy could be maintained 
by monothetic dichotomous categorization, but that an 
alternative way "to achieve separateness and clarity of 
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actually continuous categories is by conceiving of each 
category in terms of its clear cases rather than its 
boundaries" (1978, pp. 35-36). Rosch's second major 
principle, "perceived world structure," is that the world is 
not perceived as "an unstructured total set of equiprobable 
co-occurring attributes. Rather, the material objects of the 
world are perceived to possess...high correlational 
structure...what attributes will be perceived given the 
ability to perceive them is undoubtedly determined by many 
factors having to do with the functional needs of the knower 
interacting with the physical and social environment" (1978, 
p. 29) . 
Although the principle of "cognitive economy" has often 
been interpreted as inherently cognitive in the prototype 
literature, Rosch's emphasis upon a delicate balance between 
stimulus discrimination and generalization is clearly 
compatible with a behavioral perspective on categorization. 
In behavioral terms, the features of stimulus categories are 
not all equiprobable representatives of those categories. 
The presence of some features is more highly correlated with 
a given category than is the presence of other features. 
Rather than categorizing phenomena according to a 
predetermined set of necessary and sufficient criteria, we 
categorize phenomena along a flexible gradient of family 
resemblances. Moreover, the exact "correlational structure" 
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or generalization gradient of stimulus categories depends upon 
the function that the stimulus categories serve in increasing 
the effectiveness of the organism's behavior. Thus, whereas 
the monothetic approach holds that discrete categories exist 
independently of the categorizer, prototype theory holds that 
the process of categorization necessarily involves an 
interaction between the categorizer and the environment. 
Categorization systems are inevitably influenced by 
motivational forces acting upon the categorizer's behavior. 
Rosch (1978) admonishes that prototype theory has been 
subjected to many simplistic interpretations and 
misunderstandings, the most common of which involves the 
reification of the concept of the prototype. "To speak of a 
prototype at all is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; 
what is really referred to are judgments of degree of 
prototypicality...For natural-language categories, to speak 
of a single entity that is the prototype is either a gross 
misunderstanding of the empirical data or a covert theory of 
mental representation" (Rosch, 1978, p. 40). Ironically, 
however, this reification of the prototype may be exactly what 
many thinkers have done to Plato's original concept of an 
abstract "ideal form" for each category that participates in 
the imperfect nature of the concrete category members. As 
Rosch warns, the tendency to reify prototypes and to ask 
whether a category feature is or is not part of a prototype 
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harks back to the dichotomous question of whether a feature 
is or is not within the boundaries of a monothetic category. 
For example, the question of whether overly dramatic behavior 
is or is not a member of the Histrionic Personality Disorder 
prototype is only one step removed from the underlying 
question of whether overly dramatic behavior is or is not one 
of the necessary and sufficient criteria for membership within 
the monothetic category of Histrionic Personality Disorder. 
Rosch argues that such "thinking precisely violates the 
Wittgensteinian insight that we can judge how clear a case 
something is and deal with categories on the basis of clear 
cases in the total absence of information about boundaries" 
(1978, p. 36). 
In addition to the reification of the prototype, 
prototype theory has also been widely misunderstood to 
presuppose various theories about how categories are learned 
and processed. As insightfully stated by Rosch (1978) and 
reiterated by Lakoff (1987), prototype theory does not 
constitute or presuppose any specific theory regarding the 
processing, representation, or learning of categories. "A 
representation of categories in terms of conjoined necessary 
and sufficient attributes alone would probably be incapable 
of handling all of the presently known facts, but there are 
many representations other than necessary and sufficient 
attributes that are possible...prototypes only constrain but 
do not specify representation and process models" 
1978, pp. 40-41). 
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(Rosch, 
Prototype Research on Common Categories 
In addition to her theoretical insights, Rosch has led 
a series of programmatic empirical investigations, providing 
overwhelming support for prototype theory. Her research in 
this area began with the study of how arbitrary names of 
primary or "focal" colors are learned more easily than names 
of nonprimary colors by both English-speaking children and 
adults and by Dani-speaking New Guinea natives (Heider, 1972; 
Rosch, 1973). The New Guinea natives spoke Dani, a language 
that has only two color categories: mili ("dark-cool" colors, 
such as blue, green, and black) and mola ("light-warm" colors, 
such as yellow, red, and white). Although the Dani-speakers 
categorized colors within these apparently dichotomous 
categories, they discriminated new colors along generalization 
gradients. They also learned arbitrary names more easily for 
colors that were presented within a range that had a regular 
primary color, such as red, at the center than for colors that 
were presented within a range that had a nonprimary color, 
such as orange, at the center (Rosch, 1973). Despite 
differences between English and Dani speakers in the formal 
linguistic categories into which colors are divided, speakers 
of both languages apparently discriminate colors according to 
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similar generalization gradients. Similarly, Heider (1972) 
found that when four year-old English-speakers were asked to 
match a colored chip with another chip chosen from an array 
of color chips, they matched the colors best when the initial 
chip was a primary color. In this sense, primary colors 
appeared to be more prototypical of particular color ranges 
than nonprimary colors in the same general color range. 
Rosch (1973) extended her research to the examination of 
prototype categorization of natural objects and animals, such 
as chairs and birds. Rosch and her colleagues found that some 
members of a given category were consistently rated as being 
more prototypical than other members of a category. For 
example, in the case of birds, robins were consistently rated 
as being more prototypical than penguins, chickens, and 
ostriches. Further studies have demonstrated that even in 
cases when subjects do not agree on the boundaries of 
categories, they overwhelmingly agree in their judgments of 
how representative or prototypical an example is of a given 
category (Rosch, 1974, 1975a, 1975b). When a quantifiable 
property of category members, such as size, is examined, 
prototypical members actually represent the means of that 
property (Reed, 1972; Rosch, Simpson & Miller, 1976). In 
related studies (Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972), subjects 
abstracted a prototypical visual pattern from a series of dot 
patterns or line-drawn faces. These prototypical visual 
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patterns represented the central tendency of the series and 
were used by subjects as a standard against which to compare 
the prototypicality of novel visual patterns. 
Subjects1 prototypicality ratings of category members 
are measured by numerous dependent variables. These variables 
include reaction time in category naming (Rosch, 1976b) , speed 
of learning artificial categories, order and probability of 
producing examples of category members, order of learning 
category members, and speed of recognizing members of a 
category (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Among the factors that have been proposed to influence 
prototypicality ratings, Rosch and Mervis (1975) have shown 
that the number of features a category member shares with 
other members of that category is highly positively correlated 
with that category members' prototypicality ratings. 
Conversely, the number of features a category member shares 
with contrasting categories is highly negatively correlated 
with the prototypicality ratings of that category member. 
Thus, prototypicality is highest for category members that 
have the most features in common with members of that 
category, and the least features in common with members of 
other categories. Given the importance of considering how the 
presence of noncategory features affects prototypicality, 
Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Mervis, 
Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem, 1976) maintain that 
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prototypicality is a function of the "cue validity" of 
category members. 
"Cue validity is a probabilistic concept; the 
validity of a given cue x as a predictor of a given 
category y (the conditional probability of y/x) 
increases as the frequency with which cue x is 
associated with category y increases and decreases 
as the frequency with which cue x is associated with 
categories other than y increases. The cue validity 
of an entire category may be defined as the 
summation of the cue validities for that category 
of each of the attributes of the category." (Rosch, 
1978, pp. 30-31). 
The concept of cue validity, borrowed from previous 
investigators (Beach, 1964a, 1964b; Reed, 1972), is comparable 
to Tversky's (1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978) quantitative concept 
of "category resemblance," but cue validity places more weight 
upon the category features associated with contrasting 
categories. Rosch (1978, p. 37) holds that for natural 
language categories, "the extent to which items have 
attributes common to the category was highly negatively 
correlated with the extent to which they have attributes 
belonging to members of contrast categories... it is a fact 
that both representativeness within a category and 
distinctiveness from contrast categories are correlated with 
prototypicality in real categories." 
In addition to examining the determinants of 
prototypicality of category members, researchers have also 
examined the determinants of prototypicality for specific 
features or feature combinations of category members. Based 
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upon her research, Rosch (1978) reasons that the most salient 
stimulus features within a category are most likely to become 
associated with the category name. Such features, whose 
observation is most correlated with a category name, are 
judged to be the most representative or prototypical features 
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of that category. For example, in Rosch's color experiments, 
primary colors were judged as being more prototypical than 
other colors within a given color range because their stimulus 
features were more likely to be associated with the learned 
category name. Thus, the relative salience of particular 
feature combinations appears to influence which feature 
combinations will tend to co-occur with the category name, 
thereby affecting which feature combination will tend to be 
judged as more prototypical than other combinations. 
In their quest for the determinants of feature 
prototypicality, Malt and Smith (1984) have conducted 
experiments suggesting that prototypicality ratings of 
category feature combinations are influenced by the degree to 
which those features are correlated with one another. 
Prototypicality ratings are also strongly influenced by the 
extent to which the presented features represent "particularly 
salient or functional combinations" (1984, p. 250). 
Tversky and Hemenway (1984) have arrived at a similar 
conclusion in examining various properties or "parts" of 
category members (such as presence of core, roundness, and 
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juiciness for members of the apple category). These authors 
note that when subjects list the parts or properties of 
category members, they do not list every possible part, such 
as cells or molecules in the case of apples, as if each part 
were equally representative of apples. Rather, they list only 
"the attributes important for distinguishing the appearance 
or function of the object, so that the smell of flowers and 
the taste of fruit are mentioned, but not the smell or taste 
of clothing" (p. 178). The authors conclude that properties 
of natural categories are correlated with one another on the 
basis of how particular property configurations signal the 
category member's structure or function, and facilitate 
communication. 
On the basis of these findings, the prototypicality of 
feature combinations appears to be influenced by the features' 
inter-correlation, saliency, and ability to signal a 
phenomenon's structure or function, or to facilitate 
communication about that phenomenon. From a behavioral 
perspective, it is argued that all of these factors are 
important determinants of feature prototypical ity for a single 
underlying reason: they influence the degree to which feature 
combinations are discriminative for behaviors that have been 
effective in interacting with the phenomenon in question, as 
well as for behaviors that have been effective in the broader 
environment in which that phenomenon is presented. 
25 
A Behavioral Analysis of Prototype Categorization 
Following from Rosch's (1978) point that prototype 
categorization does not presuppose any particular theory of 
processing, representation, or learning, it is argued that 
prototype categorization is very compatible with a behavioral 
perspective. In fact, a non-monothetic view of categorization 
is anything but revolutionary to the field of experimental 
behavioral analysis. Behavior analysts have long held that 
a concept, such as "chair," for example, is based upon our 
generalization among all compound stimuli we call "chair," and 
our discrimination between those stimuli and the stimuli we 
do not call "chair" (Keller & Shoenfeld, 1950). Behavior 
analysts have empirically demonstrated gradients of category 
membership based upon the principles of generalization and 
discrimination (e.g., Herrnstein & Loveland, 1964; Jenkins & 
Harrison, 1960; Lea & Harrison, 1978; Morgan, Fitch, Holman, 
& Lea, 1976) . When a response has been reinforced in the 
presence of a specific stimulus property, and that stimulus 
property is varied along one or more stimulus dimensions, then 
responding to future stimuli is a function of the similarity 
of these stimuli to the original stimulus. Responses to some 
stimuli are more likely to be consequated by consistent 
differential reinforcement than are responses to other 
stimuli. Responding occurs along a generalization gradient, 
such that the effects of past reinforcement in the presence 
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of the original stimulus are transferred more to more similar 
stimuli, and less to less similar stimuli (Catania, 1984). 
Rosch's first principle of prototypical categorization, 
"cognitive economy" is compatible with the behavioral emphasis 
upon maintaining a balance between stimulus discrimination and 
generalization in facilitating effective behavior. Rosch's 
second principle, "perceived world structure," is compatible 
with the behavioral position that the categorization of 
phenomena occurs along a generalization gradient. 
Implications of Monothetic and Prototype Categorization for 
Social. Behavioral, and Personality Categories 
As compared to natural phenomena such as colors and 
objects, social, behavioral, and personality phenomena are 
often composed of more complex compound stimuli that vary 
along many stimulus dimensions. As a result of this 
complexity, the contrast between monothetic and prototype 
views of social, behavioral, and personality phenomena is 
particularly striking. For example, an etiquette expert might 
construct a monothetic classification system of behaviors such 
that all behaviors would be neatly classified as either always 
absolutely proper or always absolutely improper according to 
the particular social situation in which they were exhibited. 
A common monothetic model of categorization that associates 
specific behaviors with personality types rather than with 
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situations is the concept of a fixed set of personality traits 
that remains consistent across environmental contexts. This 
set of necessary and sufficient traits is assumed to be 
equally inherent to the various people who are members of a 
particular personality category. This approach to personality 
categorization implies that there is "only one correct God's 
eye view" of a person according to the particular personality 
category of which that person is a member (Lakoff, 1987, p. 
9) . Personality styles are particularly cumbersome for 
monothetic theory, given the heterogeneity of individuals 
within any personality category, the difficulty of specifying 
necessary and sufficient criteria for membership within a 
personality category, and the influence of personality 
theories upon different systems of personality categories. 
From a prototype perspective, social situations, 
behaviors, and personality styles are not categorized 
according to a set of necessary and sufficient criteria. 
Rather, these phenomena are categorized so that certain 
phenomena are more prototypical of a given category than are 
other phenomena. For example, specific behaviors or 
behavioral patterns are seen as more prototypical than others 
of a particular personality style. Moreover, given two people 
with a particular personality style, one person may be 
considered more prototypical of that personality style than 
the other person. Even if two individuals are viewed as 
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equally prototypical of a given personality style, it is 
possible that they may differ along many dimensions, sharing 
few specific features. According to the prototype view, the 
suitability of members to particular personality categories 
is probabilistic, rather than entirely suitable, or entirely 
unsuitable. As compared to the monothetic view of personality 
categorization, the prototype view recognizes a more 
representative proportion of within-category heterogeneity and 
between-category homogeneity. 
Prototype Research on Nonclinical Personality Categories 
Studies of the prototype categorization of personality 
categories and social situations have revealed a striking 
similarity between the factors influencing the categorization 
of these phenomena and more basic phenomena. For example, 
people categorize social situations such that some situations 
are judged to be more prototypical of a particular type of 
situation than are others (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982; 
Schutte, Kenrick, & Sandalla, 1985). Sparked by their 
interest in the interaction between person and situation, 
Cantor and Mischel (1977) have also focused on the prototype 
categorization of personality types. They hypothesized that 
personality traits actually function as conceptual prototypes 
that help us make sense of and predict other people's 
behavior. Using a series of trait adjectives, associated with 
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the prototypes of extroversion and introversion, they 
formulated brief written descriptions of four characters. 
These included an extravert, an introvert, a nonextravert 
control character, and a nonintrovert control character. In 
one condition, the extravert and introvert characters were 
explicitly identified as such to the subjects. In another 
condition, however, they were not identified as such. Results 
from a memory recognition task showed that subjects 
selectively recognized conceptually related, but unpresented 
items for the extravert and introvert characters, whether or 
not they had been explicitly labeled as such. Thus, whether 
subjects received a personality label or not, they still 
formed an overall impression of the introvert and extrovert, 
which in turn resulted in their selective recognition of 
actually unpresented category-consistent information. Cantor 
and Mischel concluded from these results that even when people 
are not exposed to an explicit label of others' personality 
styles, they tend to organize and recall information about 
others as a function of others' similarity to pre-existing, 
trait-based prototypes. 
Cantor (1978) continued this line of research in her 
dissertation, suggesting that at least three factors influence 
the prototypical categorization of personality, given 
extensive exposure to another person. These factors are 
termed breadth, dominance, and differentiation. First, 
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breadth is the number and variety of different 
category-consistent attributes displayed (Cantor, 1978? Cantor 
& Mischel, 1979b). It was hypothesized that person who 
exhibits a greater number of category-consistent attributes 
will be judged as more prototypical of that particular 
category than a person who exhibits a smaller number of 
category-consistent attributes. Second, dominance is the 
number of category-consistent attributes relative to the total 
number of attributes displayed. It was hypothesized that 
"perceived prototypicality increases with increases in the 
ratio of the category-consistent attributes displayed relative 
to the total set of attributes displayed by the individual. 
Prototypicality will increase as the category-consistent 
attributes assume a position of 'figure' against the 
•background' of the total configuration" (Cantor & Mischel, 
1979b, p. 32) . A third possible factor affecting the 
categorization of personality is differentiation: the degree 
to which the displayed attributes can be differentiated from 
contrasting or incompatible categories. The authors 
hypothesize that people "negatively weight such attributes in 
judgments of prototypicality according to the degree of 
incompatibility with the type" (Cantor & Mischel, 1979b, p. 
33) . 
In her dissertation, Cantor (1978) examined the effects 
of breadth, dominance, and differentiation upon subjects' 
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ratings of characters* prototypicality. She first had 
subjects generate personality descriptions of friends they 
had who were good, moderate, or poor examples of an extravert. 
Then, a second group of six judges rated the prototypicality 
of the descriptions. The ratings among the judges were 
reliable at 0.87. A "breadth-dominance-differentiation" index 
for each character was determined by statistically combining 
the three factors, and was then used to predict subjects* 
prototypicality ratings of each character. The 
breadth-dominance-differentiation scores for each character 
were highly correlated with the prototypicality ratings. 
Given restricted exposure, rather than extensive 
exposure, Cantor predicted that "prototypicality would be 
increased when the target individual exhibited the most 
central (highly associated) category attribute(s) consistently 
and intensely across many situations and particularly in 
situations where such behavior is non-normative" (Cantor, 
1978, p. 4645-B) . Cantor constructed three "behavioral 
episodes" or paragraph-length short stories describing 
extravert or bright-intelligent characters. The characters 
were rated as more prototypical when they were consistently 
outgoing or intelligent in three non-normative situations, as 
opposed to normative situations. Given these results, Cantor 
(1978) concluded that prototypicality is "a joint function of 
stimulus factors associated with the target person's behavior 
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and with the observation environment" (Cantor, 1978, p. 4645). 
Continuing to pursue the question of how consistency in 
behavior influences prototypicality judgments, Cantor and 
Mischel (1979b) constructed a series of characters who were 
to some degree introverts, extravert, or good samaritans. The 
characters were pure, mixed, or inconsistent characters. The 
pure types were purely introverts, extravert, or good 
samaritans; the mixed (but not inconsistent) types were either 
part introvert or extravert and always part good Samaritan; 
and the inconsistent types were part introvert and part 
extravert. The authors found that information about 
consistent characters was remembered more accurately than 
information about inconsistent characters. In a free recall 
test, subjects were the most accurate and wrote the most 
information about the pure consistent characters, as opposed 
to the mixed or inconsistent characters. Subjects were more 
accurate and wrote more information about mixed characters 
than inconsistent characters. Cantor and Mischel (1979b) 
conclude that these results support the hypothesis that 
information is structured and remembered according to how it 
matches with pre-existing personality prototypes. 
Prototype Categorization and Psvchodiaanosis 
The empirical research in the realm of common object and 
personality categories can be extended to diagnostic 
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categories. Many theorists of psychopathology view diagnostic 
categories as a "necessary evil." On the one hand, diagnostic 
categories are essential in communicating information about 
clients to other clinicians, as well as to oneself at a future 
date. Diagnoses may also provide clues to clinicians 
regarding additional features to inquire about during 
assessment, as well as clues about etiology and treatment. 
On the other hand, many clinicians feel that diagnostic 
categories are too narrow to reflect the diversity of clinical 
phenomena in the real world. A common criticism that 
clinicians have of diagnostic systems is that they invariably 
pigeon-hole individual clients into homogeneous categories 
that are not particularly descriptive of any one category 
member. Diagnostic systems have also received the opposite 
criticism of failing to reduce the heterogeneity that exists 
among clients with the same diagnosis (e.g., Blum, 1978; King, 
1954; Rotter, 1954). Possibly as a result of this within-
category heterogeneity, as well as between-category 
homogeneity, the reliability of diagnostic categories is 
reduced (e.g., Eysenck, 1952; Scott, 1958). As Cantor, Smith, 
French & Mezzich (1980) have noted, however, most "critiques 
of the psychiatric diagnostic system seem to presuppose a 
classical view of categorization" (p. 181). 
An advantage of prototype categorization over monothetic 
categorization is that the prototype approach explicitly 
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recognizes heterogeneity within diagnostic categories, and 
homogeneity between diagnostic categories. Thus, compared to 
the monothetic model of categorization, the prototype model 
represents a more realistic map of the complexity of various 
clinical phenomena. Moreover, the prototype approach holds 
different implications for the appropriateness of particular 
diagnoses for particular clients. According to the 
assumptions underlying monothetic theory, atypical and 
borderline cases reflect aberrations in an otherwise accurate 
classification system. Such cases suggest that not all of the 
necessary and sufficient criteria for category membership have 
been identified. Given this assumption that atypicalities 
reflect a deficiency in an otherwise refined classification 
system, the monothetic approach fails to recognize that 
atypicalities are inevitable real world phenomena. In 
contrast, the prototype approach to categorization uses the 
existence of atypicalities to its advantage, basing 
categorization upon the principle that some category members 
are more typical of a given category than are other category 
members. 
The relatively low diagnostic reliability of the 
personality disorders within the current psychiatric 
nosological system, for example, can be understood as context 
specific. In borderline cases reliability is expected to be 
low, whereas in prototypical cases reliability is expected to 
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be high (Blashfield, Sprock, Haymaker, & Hodgin, 1989). 
Reliability in diagnosing an instance of a particular disorder 
could be predicted, at least in part, by its degree of 
similarity to the prototype for that diagnostic category. 
Methods of determining diagnostic reliability could be adapted 
to this model. Traditional "indices of reliability based upon 
the agreement between independent clinicians when assigning 
patients to discrete diagnostic categories, are inappropriate 
for fuzzy categories with probabilistic membership. The more 
significant question is whether clinicians agree when rating 
prototypicality" (Livesley, 1985b, pp. 356-357). Diagnostic 
reliability based upon prototypicality ratings may be much 
higher than diagnostic reliability based upon the "all or 
nothing" designation of a particular diagnosis. 
As noted earlier, the introduction of the DSM-III and 
the DSM-III-R represents a move from monothetic categorization 
to polythetic categorization (Cantor et al. 1980; Clarkin, 
Widiger, Frances, Hurt, & Gilmore, 1983). The DSM-III-R 
categories do not require that a set of necessary and 
sufficient diagnostic criteria be met equally by each 
individual client given a particular diagnosis. Rather, each 
client need only exhibit a portion of a given set of 
correlated features in a variety of combinations. For 
example, the DSM-III-R requires that a client meet any five 
of nine possible criteria to be diagnosed with Narcissistic 
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Personality Disorder. The DSM-III-R also represents a move 
toward prototype categorization in that some diagnoses require 
the presence of one or two critical features, and then only 
a portion of several less critical features. For example, a 
DSM-III-R diagnosis of Major Depression requires that either 
dysphoric mood or loss of interest and enjoyment in activities 
be present, along with a portion of less diagnostically 
efficient criteria. This requirement suggests that some 
features are considered more prototypical than others of a 
given diagnostic category. Clarkin et al. (1983) note that 
the DSM-III is more prototypic than DSM-II in that it "(a) 
requires multiaxial diagnoses, (b) encourages multiple 
diagnoses within each of its axes, and (c) does not rely on 
the assumption that mental disorders are discrete entities" 
(p. 263). It should be noted, however, that despite this 
progress toward prototype categorization, the current 
psychiatric diagnostic system is still based largely upon a 
monothetic view of categorization. 
Prototype Research on Psvchodiaanostic Categories 
Several major lines of research on prototype 
categorization have been conducted in the area of 
psychodiagnosis. Cantor and her colleagues were among the 
first to bridge basic prototype research on natural categories 
to clinical research on psychodiagnosis. Cantor et al. (1980) 
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constructed prototypes of nine DSM-II (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1968) diagnoses based upon the characteristic 
features of those categories according to the consensus of 13 
experienced clinicians. The diagnostic categories included 
Functional Psychosis, Schizophrenia, Affective Disorder, 
Paranoid Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, Chronic 
Undifferentiated Schizophrenia, Manic-Depressive—Manic, 
Manic-Depressive—Depressed, and Involutional Melancholia. 
These consensual prototypes served as standards against which 
to compare actual cases. The authors then selected 12 actual 
patient cases from a psychiatric hospital. The cases were 
selected so as to represent four different disorders with 
three instances of each disorder. The four disorders were 
Manic-Depressive—Manic, Manic-Depressive-Depressed, Paranoid 
Schizophrenia, and Chronic Undifferentiated Schizophrenia. 
For each of the four disorders, there were three cases with 
different levels of typicality, relative to the standard 
prototypes obtained previously. The high typical patients' 
case histories contained 8 to 13 features of the standard 
prototype, whereas the medium typical patients' case histories 
contained 5 to 8 prototypical features, and the low typical 
patients' case histories contained 4 prototypical features. 
Note that the category features had already been determined 
to be of high typicality, and the level of typicality was 
determined by the number of highly typical features included 
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in the case histories, rather than by variations in the 
typicality of the features themselves. 
The authors asked nine experienced clinicians to diagnose the 
12 patients on the basis of unedited medical histories. As 
predicted, diagnostic reliability was significantly higher for 
cases with a medium or high number of highly typical category 
features than for cases with a low number of highly typical 
category features. Cantor et al. (1980) concluded that the 
number of prototypical features presented in a case has a 
strong bearing on clinicians' subsequent diagnostic 
reliability for that case. 
In a later study, Cantor and Genero (1986) used the same 
typical and atypical case histories to examine the effects of 
a summary versus exemplar prototype teaching paradigm upon the 
diagnostic reliability of novice versus expert diagnosticians. 
In the summary prototype condition, a list of prototypical 
features and their associated typicality weights for four 
disorders were presented to the subjects. The four disorders 
were the same as those presented to subjects in Cantor et 
al. 's (1980) study. Whereas information about the diagnostic 
categories in the summary prototype condition was given in the 
form of a list of weighted features, information about the 
diagnostic categories in the exemplar prototype condition was 
given in the form of two paragraph-length case vignettes. For 
each of the four diagnostic categories, two heterogeneous case 
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exemplars were given with different category features reported 
in each case vignette. The vignettes contained various 
demographic features to personalize each vignette, and to 
prevent them from being confused with other vignettes. Cantor 
and Genero (1987) predicted that both novice undergraduate 
diagnosticians would diagnose later cases more reliably and 
confidently when they had received exemplar prototype 
training, rather than summary prototype training. They 
predicted that in contrast to the summary prototype training, 
exemplar prototype training would emphasize the heterogeneity 
among members of a given diagnostic category. Those results 
were borne out for the expert clinicians only. The authors 
found that exemplar prototype training, as opposed to summary 
prototype training, enhanced the expert clinicians' diagnostic 
reliability and confidence ratings of the accuracy of their 
diagnoses. In contrast, summary prototype training, relative 
to exemplar prototype training, enhanced the novice 
diagnosticians' reliability and confidence ratings. 
Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, and Parad (1981b) have 
extended the prototype categorization research on adult 
diagnostic categories to child diagnostic categories. 
According to expert staff members at a child inpatient 
psychiatric facility, the three most common types of children 
seen there were the "aggressive-impulsive" child, the 
"depressed-withdrawn" child, and the "borderline-disorganized" 
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child. Horowitz et al. (1981b) had the clinicians generate 
a prototype for each category by listing typical behaviors, 
thoughts, and feelings for children in each category. In Part 
2 of this study, the authors compared the expert clinicians' 
lists of prototypical features for the three child categories 
with lists of prototypical features provided by college 
students who had either minimal clinical experience at the 
facility or no clinical experience. In general, the lists of 
features provided by the students represented only a subset 
of the prototypical features listed by the experts. Moreover, 
some of the novices' listed features were not included in the 
experts' lists of prototypical features. The authors conclude 
that compared to novices' prototypes, experts' prototypes 
appear to be more sophisticated in including important 
prototypical features and excluding irrelevant features, again 
illustrating the importance of subject variables in 
categorization. 
In another study, Horowitz, Post, French, Wallis, and 
Siegelman (1981a) examined the extent to which the number of 
prototypical features presented in a case history influenced 
clinicians' diagnostic reliability. Horowitz et al. (1981a) 
generated prototypes of depression by asking 35 undergraduates 
to describe a person who was a good example of someone who was 
depressed. The essays were then divided into 3 groups: the 
first group contained only 1 prototypical feature, the second 
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group contained 4 to 9 prototypical features, and the third 
group contained 17 to 20 prototypical features. The word 
"depressed" was not contained in any of the essays. The 
essays were then rated by another group of undergraduates 
along several dimensions. The authors found that persons 
described in essays with a greater number of prototypical 
features of depression were rated as significantly more 
depressed than persons described in essays with fewer 
prototypical features. Horowitz et al. (1981a) also found 
that the number of prototypical depressive features influenced 
clinicians' diagnostic reliability. The authors had 
clinicians observe a series of videotapes of clients who were 
depressed to different degrees. They found that clinicians 
disagreed more about the degree of a client's depression given 
few prototypical features, suggesting that the low number of 
features may have "activated" the full prototype for some 
clinicians, but not for others. 
Horowitz et al. (1981a) then turned to a different 
question. In the diagnostic process, how important is the 
absence of irrelevant or contradictory features relative to 
the presence of relevant prototypical features? The authors 
presented case summaries of 26 psychiatric patients to 20 
experienced clinicians, who provided diagnoses. The authors 
included with each case description a checklist of 
commonly-given DSM-II diagnoses. The clinicians were asked 
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to check off any diagnoses on the list that might be possible 
for each client. The authors then generated eight diagnostic 
sets of case descriptions, with three instances of each of 
eight DSM-II disorders. The three instances varied from low, 
medium, to high diagnostic reliability obtained by the 
clinicians. Horowitz et al. (1981a) then asked undergraduates 
to rate on a 5-point scale the presence or absence of 
prototypical features. The diagnostic criteria listed for the 
corresponding new DSM-III diagnoses were randomly presented 
to the undergraduates on a checklist. The authors found that 
relative to cases with a low number of "relevant" category 
features, cases with a high number of category features were 
associated with significantly higher diagnostic reliability. 
In contrast, the number of "irrelevant" noncategory features 
wcs not significantly different across cases with different 
levels of diagnostic reliability. 
The question of whether or not competing diagnostic 
features undermine clinicians' diagnostic reliability is 
especially pertinent to the personality disorders. 
Approximately two-thirds of the clients who meet the criteria 
for one personality disorder meet the criteria for at least 
one more (Clarkin et al, 1983; Mellsop et al, 1982; Stangl et 
al, 1984) . Moreover, many of the features of personality 
disorders are shared by other personality disorders, making 
for an even more fuzzy distinction between these categories. 
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Prototype Research on Personality Disorders 
Results similar to those of Horowitz et al. (1981a) were 
found by Blashfield, Sprock, Haymaker, and Hodgin (1989) in 
a study of factors affecting diagnostic judgments of the 
personality disorders. These investigators found a 
significant positive correlation between diagnostic 
reliability and number of category features. The number of 
features from other personality disorders, however, did not 
significantly affect diagnostic reliability. These findings 
contradict Livesley's (1985a, 1985b) hypothesis of a negative 
correlation between measures of prototypical ity and the number 
of competing diagnostic features. 
In one study, Blashfield, Sprock, Pinkston, and Hodgin 
(1985) attempted to isolate prototypical case examples of the 
11 DSM-III personality disorders on the basis of high 
diagnostic reliability and rapid diagnostic reaction time. 
Thirty cases were selected from sources such as the DSM-III 
Case Book (Spitzer, Skodol, & Gibbon, 1981), the DSM-III 
Training Guide (Webb, DiClemente, Johnston, Sanders, & Perley, 
1981), and various professional papers. Among the 30 cases, 
prototype cases were isolated for only seven of the 
personality disorders. Unlike other studies, prototypicality 
in this study was not determined by prototypicality ratings 
of cases or features, but rather by diagnostic reliability and 
diagnostic reaction times. 
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Whereas the Blashfield et al. (1985) study examined the 
prototypicality of clinical feature combinations in the form 
of case summaries, other studies have attempted to quantify 
the prototypicality of specific clinical features. In a study 
of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), Clarkin et al. 
(1983) calculated conditional probabilities as a means of 
quantifying the "diagnostic efficiency" of both individual 
diagnostic criteria and combinations of diagnostic criteria. 
The conditional probability of a BPD diagnosis associated with 
the presence of all possible diagnostic features and feature 
combinations was calculated. The authors note that a feature 
that is highly prevalent in BPD clients may not necessarily 
be a discriminating diagnostic feature if that feature 
overlaps with other personality disorders (e.g., poor 
interpersonal relationships), or with other person categories 
(e.g., being in therapy). For example, the authors found that 
although impulsivity occurred in 100% of the BPD cases, its 
conditional probability associated with a BPD diagnosis was 
lowered by the fact that it also occurred in 25% of patients 
with another personality disorder. The results revealed that 
both individual and combined features did vary in diagnostic 
efficiency. The authors concluded that computing the 
conditional probability of particular feature combinations 
represents an empirical method of demonstrating how some 
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features and feature combinations are more prototypical than 
others of the personality disorders. 
Whereas Clarkin et al. (1983) examined the 
prototypicality of features present in BPD subjects, other 
researchers have obtained prototypicality ratings of features 
from clinician subjects. For example, Livesley (1986a, 1986b) 
collected trait and behavior descriptions for each of the 11 
DSM-III personality disorders from various sources, including 
DSM-III, the ninth edition of the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD-9; U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1980), and texts by Vaillant and Perry (1980), 
Millon (1981), and Lion (1981). Livesley then designed a 
series of 22 questionnaires, with a separate trait and 
behavior questionnaire for each of the 11 personality 
disorders. One of the 22 questionnaires was then mailed to 
each of 2,960 psychiatrists belonging to either the Canadian 
Psychiatric Association or to the American Psychiatric 
Association. In completing the questionnaires, the 
psychiatrists were asked to think of prototypical patients 
rather than average patients, and to rate each item on a 
7-point scale on the basis of its prototypical ity. The results 
of the study revealed that the prototypicality ratings for 
both traits and behaviors were highly reliable across the 938 
respondents. Livesley also found that some personality 
disorders were associated with more unique, distinctive 
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features than were other personality disorders. Moreover, 
certain features of each disorder were rated as being more 
prototypical than other features. The study eventuated in a 
list of the mean prototypicality ratings for various traits 
and behaviors associated with each of the personality 
disorders. 
Expanding upon Livesley's work on the prototypicality 
and distinctiveness of traits associated with the personality 
disorders, Boykin (1987) examined how these variables actually 
affect the psychodiagnostic process. Neither feature 
prototypicality nor feature distinctiveness had been 
investigated previously within the context of the 
psychodiagnostic process. In his dissertation, Boykin (1987) 
designed a set of personality profiles based upon Livesley's 
extensive data on the prototypicality and distinctiveness of 
the traits associated with the "erratic cluster" of the 
personality disorders. This cluster includes the Antisocial, 
Borderline, Histrionic, and Narcissistic Personality 
Disorders. Each profile consisted of a constant number of six 
features associated with a given personality disorder. The 
features were varied according to whether they were 
distinctive or shared with other personality disorders, and 
were of either high or low prototypicality or "centrality." 
A total of 20 licensed clinical psychologists were asked 
provide diagnoses and prototypicality ratings for a series of 
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32 personality profiles. A composite diagnostic 
accuracy-typicality score was calculated for each subject. 
Diagnostic accuracy was determined according to which disorder 
the investigator had intended to portray in each profile, 
based upon the feature prototypicality ratings provided by 
Livesley. Boykin hypothesized that clinicians would assign 
higher accuracy-typicality scores to cases with features that 
were more prototypical of the intended disorder than to cases 
with features that were less prototypical. It was also 
predicted that cases with fewer features that are shared with 
other personality disorders would be diagnosed as more 
prototypical than cases with more shared features. 
Additionally, Boykin predicted that cases with both highly 
prototypical and distinctive features would be assigned higher 
prototypicality ratings than cases with both low prototypical 
and shared features. 
As predicted, significant main effects for feature 
prototypicality and distinctiveness, as well as a significant 
interaction between the two were revealed. Relative to 
profiles with low central features, those with high 
prototypical features were associated with much higher 
accuracy-typicality scores. Moreover, relative to profiles 
with features shared by other disorders, profiles with 
distinctive features were associated with higher 
accuracy-typicality scores. As predicted an interaction 
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emerged, in which profiles with high prototypical and 
distinctive features yielded the highest accuracy-typicality 
scores, whereas profiles with low prototypical and shared 
features yielded the lowest accuracy-typicality scores. 
Additionally, the remaining conditions consisting of either 
low prototypical, distinctive features, or high prototypical, 
shared features were associated with moderate diagnostic 
reliability and prototypicality ratings. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of the present study was to examine how three 
critical variables interact to impact clinicians' diagnosing 
behavior. The results of previous research suggest that the 
number of category features and the prototypicality of those 
features are among the most important factors affecting 
judgments of category membership. The factor that has 
received the most attention in the literature is number. 
Studies of the categorization of basic objects (e.g., Rosch 
& Mervis, 1975), of personality types (e.g., Cantor, 1978), 
and of psychodiagnosis (Blashfield et al., 1989; Cantor et 
al., 1980; Horowitz et al., 1981a) reveal that the higher the 
number of category features comprising a stimulus, the more 
likely that stimulus will be judged as a prototypical member 
of that category. Note, however, that a review of the studies 
on the importance of category feature number (Blashfield et 
49 
al., 1989; Horowitz et aLf 1981a? Rosch & Mervis, 1975), 
reveals that the category features included in the number that 
was varied were derived from previously constructed prototypes 
of diagnostic categories. Therefore, rather that simply 
varying the number of category features, these studies varied 
the number of highly prototypical category features. Although 
this process precluded an analysis of the separate effects of 
feature number and feature typicality, the highly significant 
effect for number of highly prototypical features was 
attributed, in each of the studies, to category feature 
number, rather than to feature typicality. The present study 
is the first to examine the independent effects of category 
feature number and category feature typicality. 
The effects of the prototypicality of individual category 
features have been examined in several studies (Cantor, 1978; 
Cantor & Mischel, 1979b; Clarkin et al., 1983; Schutte et al. 
1985), with the general finding that stimuli composed of more 
prototypical features are more likely to be judged as members 
of the corresponding category, and are rated as more 
prototypical members of the category, relative to stimuli 
composed of less prototypical features. Again, however, aside 
from the present study, only one study (Boykin, 1987) has 
examined feature prototypicality as a determinant of 
psychodiagnostic judgments. 
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Finally, the proportion of category features to the total 
number of features, termed "feature dominance", has been 
examined in only one study (Cantor, 1978). In this study, 
however, dominance and number were not varied factorially, but 
rather, were combined in a single breadth-dominance-
differentiation index. Therefore, these factors could not be 
analyzed for their independent contribution to prototypicality 
judgments. Moreover, Cantor's (1978) study did not examine 
dominance as a determinant of the actual psychodiagnostic 
process. Three other studies examined the impact of mixed or 
irrelevant features upon prototypical ity judgments. Cantor and 
Mischel (1979) found that features associated with consistent 
characters were recalled more accurately than were features 
associated with mixed personality characters, than were 
features associated with contradictory personality characters. 
Although the authors did not examine dominance per se, they 
found that the presence of extraneous and contradictory 
noncategory features significantly impacted the accuracy with 
which information about the characters was recalled. In 
another study by Horowitz et al. (1981a), variations in the 
number of "irrelevant" noncategory features in clinical case 
histories were not associated with different levels of 
diagnostic reliability. Rosch and Mervis (1975) found that 
the number of contrasting noncategory features of a category 
member was highly negatively correlated with prototypicality 
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ratings of that category member. The present study was the 
first to examine dominance as the proportion of category 
features over all presented features, and to vary dominance 
and number factorially prior to the psychodiagnostic process. 
The present study varied dominance and number factorially to 
compare the relative importance of the number of category 
features present with the proportion of category features. 
As noted above, the present study examined the role of 
feature number, feature typicality, and dominance as 
determinants of the psychodiagnostic process. By examining 
the possibility of main effects for each of these factors 
across the other two factors, the present study assessed the 
impact of each of the variables across various contexts. This 
study examined how feature number, feature typicality, and 
dominance impact diagnostic judgments about the DSM-III 
personality disorders. The personality disorders readily lend 
themselves to an investigation of prototype categorization for 
several reasons. First, the criteria for the various 
personality disorders often overlap, thereby highlighting the 
degree of similarity between the different personality 
disorders. Second, clients with one personality disorder 
often meet some or all of the criteria for other personality 
disorders, thereby highlighting the heterogeneity of clients 
who meet the criteria for a given personality disorder. 
Third, although personality disorder diagnoses are widely used 
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by clinicians in describing clients, these diagnoses typically 
are associated with poorer diagnostic reliability than other 
diagnostic categories. This lower diagnostic reliability may 
reflect the inappropriateness of a monothetic categorization 
system for clinical diagnoses in general, and for the more 
nebulous personality disorders in particular. 
On the basis of past research, main effects were 
predicted for feature typicality and feature number. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that personality 
descriptions containing highly typical category features would 
be associated with higher measures of diagnostic reliability, 
diagnostic "accuracy," and prototypicality compared with 
personality descriptions containing relatively low typical 
category features. Similarly, personality descriptions 
containing a high number of category features were 
hypothesized to be associated with higher measures of 
diagnostic reliability, diagnostic "accuracy," and 
prototypicality relative to personality descriptions 
containing a low number of category features. 
Based upon past research, it was predicted that the 
variables of feature typicality and feature number would be 
so highly significant, and would consume so much of the 
variance in any one analysis, that an otherwise significant 
main effect for dominance would not emerge. Therefore, a main 
effect for dominance was predicted only upon the condition 
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that enough variance would be spared by what were predicted 
to be the highly significant main effects for feature 
typicality and feature number. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that personality descriptions containing a high 
proportion of category features to noncategory features would 
be associated with higher measures of prototypicality, 
diagnostic "accuracy," and diagnostic reliability compared 
with personality descriptions containing a low proportion of 
category features. In addition, interactions between the 
variables of dominance, feature typicality, and feature number 
were predicted. In particular, dominance was predicted to 
have a greater influence upon diagnostic judgments under 
certain conditions in which either feature typicality or 
feature number, or both feature typicality and feature number, 
were relatively low. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subi ects 
A total of 32 licensed doctoral-level clinical and 
counseling psychologists practicing within a 100-mile radius 
of Greensboro, North Carolina, served as participants in the 
study. Potential subjects were randomly selected from the 
telephone directories of Greensboro, High Point, Chapel Hill, 
Durham, and Raleigh, North Carolina, and from a mailing list 
of licensed clinical psychologists provided by the North 
Carolina State Board of Examiners of Practicing Psychologists. 
Initially, 125 potential subjects were solicited, given a 
projected positive response rate of 30%. Subjects were mailed 
a solicitation letter explaining the nature of the study, and 
a response form on the back of a pre-addressed stamped 
postcard (see Appendix A for all materials mailed to 
subjects). The solicitation letter stated that potential 
participants must fulfill the following inclusion criteria: 
(a) permanent licensure as a psychologist for at least three 
years; (b) clinical work primarily with adults; and (c) 
expertise in diagnosing personality disorders. Potential 
participants were asked to return the postcard indicating 
whether or not they would be interested in participating in 
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the study. Initially, 35 clinicians agreed to participate. 
Experimental materials were mailed to the first 32 of these 
clinicians who agreed to participate. Only 27 of the 32 
subjects who were sent the experimental materials actually 
completed the study. The other five subjects either reported 
that they did not find time to complete the study, or mailed 
back incomplete materials. Therefore, experimental materials 
were mailed to the remaining three clinicians who had 
initially agreed to participate, as well as to two newly 
solicited subjects, making for a final total of 32 subjects. 
The subjects also completed a brief demographics 
questionnaire, the results of which are presented in Table 1 
(This table and all subsequent tables are located in Appendix 
B) . The number of subjects that were included in the 
calculation of each demographic measure reported in Table 1 
varied because some subjects did not respond to all of the 
demographic questions. As depicted in the table, an equal 
number of male and female clinicians participated as subjects. 
A total of 91% of the subjects worked primarily in private 
practice, and 9% worked primarily at a hospital setting. The 
clinicians1 mean age was 41.5 years, and their mean number of 
years of clinical experience was 13.6 years. The mean number 
of personality disorder cases (with or without coexisting Axis 
I diagnoses) assessed in the last six months was 14.4 cases. 
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Experimental Design 
Three experimental designs, depicted in Appendix C, were 
created so that specific combinations of the designs could 
later be analyzed. Design 1 is a two (medium typicality vs. 
high typicality) by two (low category feature number vs. high 
category feature number) factorial design with each of the 
factors being within-subjects. Design 2 is a two (medium 
typicality vs. high typicality) by two (low category feature 
number vs. high category feature number) factorial design with 
each of the factors being within-subjects. Design 3 is a two 
(medium typicality vs. high typicality) by two (low category 
feature number vs. high category feature number) factorial 
design with each of the factors being within-subjects. As 
illustrated in Appendix C, Designs 1, 2, and 3 differ from one 
another in the proportion of category features over total 
features, as well as in the number of total features included 
in each design. For Design 1 and Design 2, one-third of the 
total number of features within each cell are category 
features. For Design 3, however, two-thirds of the total 
number of features within each cell are category features. 
Therefore, the dominance of the category features over the 
total number of features within the cells of Design 1 and 
Design 2 is low relative to the dominance of the category 
features within the cells of Design 3. For Design 1 and 
Design 3, the number of total features within each cell is 
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either 3 or 9. For Design 2, however, the number of total 
features within each cell is either 6 or 18. Therefore, 
overall, the total number of features within each cell of 
Design 1 and Design 3 is lower relative to the total number 
of features within the corresponding cells of Design 2. By 
combining all three designs, there were 12 different 
experimental conditions. 
Each subject received twelve personality profiles, 
corresponding to each of the twelve experimental conditions. 
Of the twelve profiles, three profiles corresponded to each 
of the four personality disorders that comprise the "erratic 
cluster" according to DSM-III-R. These are the antisocial, 
borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality 
disorders. The disorders portrayed in the profiles were 
counterbalanced across the experimental conditions. 
The twelve experimental conditions were determined by 
the following four independent variables or factors: feature 
typicality, feature dominance, feature number, and total 
feature number. The first factor is the level of typicality 
of the category features included in the personality profiles. 
The second factor, feature dominance, is the relative 
proportion of category features to the total number of 
features presented in the personality profiles. The third 
factor is the number of category features presented in the 
profiles. The fourth factor is the total number of both 
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category and noncategory features depicted in the profiles. 
These independent variables, as well as the dependent 
variables, are operationalized below. 
Stimulus materials 
The entire set of materials sent to each subject upon 
their agreement to participate in the study is presented in 
Appendix A, and includes the following: an introductory 
letter, experimental instructions, the twelve profile sheets, 
a demographics questionnaire, and a stamped envelope, 
pre-addressed to the principal investigator. At the bottom 
of each of the profile sheets was a list of all 11 personality 
disorders described in the DSM-III-R. Subjects were asked to 
indicate on this list the diagnosis that best fit the person 
described in the profile. Next to each listed disorder is a 
1-7 Likert-scale; subjects were to rate how typical the person 
described in the profile was of each of the disorders, with 
one being the least typical case, and seven being the most 
typical case. 
The personality profiles were based upon data kindly 
provided by Dr. John Livesley of the University of British 
Columbia. As described previously, Livesley (1986a, 1986b) 
generated a set of lists of the clinical features associated 
with each of the 11 personality disorders. The features were 
given typicality ratings by nearly 1000 psychiatrists. Based 
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upon these data, Livesley has listed the clinical features 
associated with each disorder in descending order of 
typicality, from those features that were rated as being most 
typical of the disorder, to those that were rated as being 
least typical of the disorder. Livesley then divided the 
feature lists for each disorder into four quartiles, with the 
first quartile composed of the most typical features, and the 
fourth quartile composed of the least typical features. 
Livesley provided the experimenter with the first, 
second, third, and fourth quartiles of the feature lists for 
the "erratic cluster" of the personality disorders, which 
includes the Antisocial, Borderline, Histrionic, and 
Narcissistic personality disorders. He also provided the 
fourth quartile of the feature lists for the other seven 
personality disorders that are not included in the erratic 
cluster. 
Based upon these data, a total of 48 personality profiles 
were constructed by the present author, with a profile 
representing each of the four erratic cluster personality 
disorders in each of the twelve experimental conditions. 
Although each subject received twelve profiles, the disorders 
portrayed by the profiles were counterbalanced across the 
experimental conditions so that each subject received only 
three instances of each of the four disorders. The twelve 
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profiles sent to each subject were also randomly ordered to 
control for sequence effects. 
Additionally, 4 versions of each of the 48 profiles were 
created in which the order of the features' presentation was 
varied randomly. Thus, for any 1 of the 48 profiles, there 
were 8 clinicians who received that profile, and among those 
8 clinicians, only 2 received the same order of feature 
presentation. The low number of features in some of the 
profiles prevented the creation of 8 versions of feature order 
that would have corresponded to the 8 clinicians who received 
any 1 of the 48 profiles. 
The experimental designs, depicted in Appendix C, 
required that the profiles be constructed in such a way that 
typicality, dominance, category feature number, and total 
feature number were varied factorially. For Design 1, the 
numbers of category features chosen for the low and high 
number conditions were one and three, respectively. These 
numbers appear as the numerators of the fractions shown within 
the cells of experimental designs. The dominance or 
proportion of category features over the total number of 
features presented is 1/3 for the low dominance condition and 
2/3 for the high dominance condition. Therefore, for Design 
1, the number of total features for low and high total number 
were three and nine, respectively. For both Designs 2 and 3, 
the number of category features varied from two to six within 
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each low or high dominance condition. The proportion of 
category features over the total number of features, however, 
remained constant within each dominance condition. 
The typicality of the category features varied from 
medium to high, rather than from low to high. The medium 
versus high typicality conditions were selected for two 
reasons. First, the noncategory features were of low 
typicality. Thus, it was necessary to present category 
features of at least medium typicality in order to obtain a 
sufficient contrast with the low typicality noncategory 
features. Secondly, the high versus medium typicality 
conditions were selected to reduce the contrast between the 
typicality conditions. This was expected to reduce the 
likelihood that a highly robust main effect for typicality 
would override any interactions among the independent 
variables. The medium typicality features were selected from 
the second and third quartiles of Livesley's data for the 
erratic cluster, whereas the high typicality features were 
selected from the first quartile. 
The noncategory features were not features that were 
completely irrelevant to the diagnostic process; they were 
contrasting features that were somewhat associated with the 
other personality disorders. The noncategory features for 
each profile constituted a combination of features, selected 
from the fourth quartiles of the typicality lists for the 
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seven personality disorders that were not included in the 
erratic cluster. Noncategory features that were not 
distinctive to any one personality disorder were selected. 
Thus, all noncategory features were both low distinctive and 
low typical. 
Dependent variables 
The subjects were asked to provide a 1-7 rating of how 
typical each profile was of each of the 11 personality 
disorders, with one being the least typical, and seven being 
the most typical. Subjects also provided a diagnosis that 
they felt best fit the person described in the profile. 
As discussed previously, Boykin (1987) used a dependent 
variable that combined accuracy and typicality by assigning 
a positive value to the 1-7 typicality ratings of accurate 
diagnoses, and a negative value to the 1-7 typicality ratings 
of inaccurate diagnoses. In the present study, however, an 
alternative dependent measure was judged to be more compatible 
with the prototype model. (For further discussion of the 
dependent measure used by Boykin (1987), as well as 
experimental results from the present study using this 
measure, see Appendix D). 
The first dependent variable is each clinician's 
prototypicality rating for the disorder that the category 
features in each profile had been intended to describe, 
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divided by the mean typicality rating given by that clinician 
for the other 10 personality disorders that were intended to 
be "noncategory" diagnoses. This dependent measure for each 
individual subject profile is represented in the following 
proportion: 
typicality rating for the intended category dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the noncategory dx's 
Note that, for each profile, each clinician assigned a rating 
of how typical the profile was of all 11 personality 
disorders. This being the case, the clinicians' typicality 
ratings for the intended category diagnosis could be assessed 
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whether or not they actually assigned that particular 
diagnosis to the profile. 
Examining the proportion of prototypicality for the 
intended category diagnosis over that for the noncategory 
diagnoses parallels Cantor's emphasis that the diagnostic 
process involves determining not only what the category is, 
but also what the category is not. For example, suppose that 
two clinicians assign a typicality rating of seven to the 
intended category diagnosis of a particular personality 
profile. The first clinician may have assigned a mean 
typicality rating of two to the other, noncategory diagnoses, 
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whereas the second clinician may have assigned a mean 
typicality rating of five to the noncategory diagnoses. These 
cases illustrate that even if clinicians assign the same 
ratings to the category diagnosis, the significance of those 
ratings depends upon the context of noncategory 
prototypicality in which they were assigned. A further 
benefit of using this proportion as a dependent variable also 
controls for variability in the data due to any possible 
tendencies of subjects to give either low or high typicality 
ratings in general. 
Since prototypical ity was rated on a 1-7 scale, the 
highest possible proportion of category to noncategory 
prototypicality was 7/1 or seven. The lowest possible 
proportion was 1/7. If the category and noncategory diagnoses 
were rated with equal typicality (e.g., 5/5 or 7/7), then the 
proportion would equal one. 
The second dependent variable is similar to the first 
except that it combines typicality with diagnostic 
reliability, rather than with diagnostic accuracy. The second 
dependent variable was each subject's prototypicality rating 
of the diagnosis most commonly assigned by the clinicians in 
a given experimental condition, divided by the subject's mean 
typicality rating for the remaining nonmodal diagnoses. This 
dependent measure for each individual subject profile is 
represented in the following proportion: 
65 
typicality rating for the modal dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonmodal dx's 
This measure allows for an examination of the relative 
typicality ratings for the most reliably assigned diagnoses 
of the personality profiles. To the extent that the subjects' 
modal diagnosis in a given condition corresponded to the 
diagnoses intended by the experimenter according to Livesley's 
(1986a, 1986b) data, then this second dependent measure would 
be identical to the first measure described above. The 
inclusion of this measure was important given Boykin's (1987) 
finding that for cases in which clinicians' diagnoses 
disagreed with the intended diagnosis of the profiles, the 
clinicians often tended to agree with each other upon an 
alternative diagnosis. 
The third dependent variable for each clinician is the 
typicality rating of the diagnosis chosen by each clinician 
as being the most prototypical of the hypothetical client, 
divided by the mean of the typicality ratings for the other 
diagnoses that were not chosen by this clinician. This 
dependent measure for each individual subject profile is 
represented in the following proportion: 
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typicality rating for the chosen dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonchosen dx's 
The fourth dependent variable is the number of chosen 
diagnoses that correspond to the intended diagnosis in a given 
condition. Finally, the fifth dependent variable is the 
number of chosen diagnoses that correspond to the modal 
diagnosis in a given condition. 
Procedure 
After consenting to participate in the study, the 
subjects received the complete packet of materials described 
above, including a set of twelve personality profiles. It 
was expected that more clinicians would be willing to 
participate if the study were conducted through the mail, 
rather than in person during their regular office hours. In 
this way they were able to complete the experiment at a time 
that was most convenient for them. The subjects were asked 
to complete the experiment in one sitting within one week of 
receiving their packet of materials. Prompts were sent to 
those clinicians whose materials were not returned within 
three weeks. 
In a procedure similar to that employed by Boykin (1987) , 
subjects were instructed to complete each of the profiles one 
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at a time, in the order presented. Subjects were reminded 
that the experiment was not a test of their clinical 
abilities, but rather a survey of their own impressions of the 
personality disorders, based upon their experience with actual 
clients. The subjects were therefore asked not to consult any 
' outside sources such as diagnostic manuals. They were also 
asked to spend a maximum of three - four minutes per case. 
The entire procedure was designed to take approximately one 
hour. The subjects were instructed to read each personality 
profile, and to imagine the person described in the profile. 
They were then asked to provide a 1-7 rating of how typical 
that person was of each of the 11 personality disorders, with 
one being the least typical, and seven being the most typical. 
After completing the typicality ratings, the subjects were 
asked to put a check mark next to one of the 11 listed 
personality disorders that they felt best fit the person 
described in the profile. After completing these steps for 
each of the twelve profiles, the subjects completed the brief 
demographics questionnaire described above. Upon receipt of 
all the participants' materials, the investigator immediately 
sent the clinicians a written debriefing statement fully 
explaining the nature of the study, and thanking them for 
their participation (Appendix A). 
68 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Overview 
This chapter is divided into five sections, corresponding 
to each of the five dependent variables. For the reader's 
convenience, a summary list of these dependent variables is 
presented in Table 2 (see Appendix B). In addition, a one-
page summary chart of the experimental results for the five 
dependent variables is presented in Table 3. Within each of 
the five sections of this chapter, the effects of each of the 
independent variables are discussed. Also addressed is the 
consistency or inconsistency of each of these effects across 
the three different combinations of Designs 1, 2, and 3 (see 
Appendix C). These combinations are as follows: 
Design Combination 1 + 2; 
Design Combination 1 + 3; 
Design Combination 2 + 3. 
The effects of the three independent variables upon each of 
the five dependent variables were analyzed within the context 
of these three design combinations. 
The three combinations of Designs 1, 2, and 3 were each 
analyzed separately in order to examine the effects of the 
experimental variables while controlling for the effects of 
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total feature number. If there had been no control for total 
feature number, then it would have covaried with dominance. 
Specifically, if the number of category features were held 
constant across the low and high dominance conditions, then 
by definition, the high dominance conditions would have been 
associated with a lower number of total features relative to 
the low dominance conditions. The addition of total feature 
number as an experimental control ensured that any main effect 
for dominance could not be attributable to the total number 
of features presented. In order to implement this control, 
the three combinations of the experimental designs described 
above were necessary. 
As illustrated in Appendix C, three of the four 
independent variables were analyzed in each of the design 
combinations. The specific set of independent variables 
varied according to the design combination, as described 
below. First, Design Combination 1+3 was analyzed as a 2 
(medium typicality vs. high typicality) by 2 (low dominance 
vs. high dominance) by 2 (low category feature number vs. high 
category feature number) factorial design, with all factors 
being within-subjects. Second, Design Combination 1+2 was 
analyzed as a 2 (medium typicality vs. high typicality) by 2 
(low total feature number vs. high total feature number) by 
2 (low category feature number vs. high category feature 
number) factorial design, with all factors being within-
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subjects. Third, Design Combination 2+3 was analyzed as a 
2 (medium typicality vs. high typicality) by 2 (low dominance 
vs. high dominance) by 2 (low category feature number vs. high 
category feature number) factorial design, with all factors 
being within-subjects. 
In general, the experimental results provided support 
for the above hypotheses, but with a few exceptions. As 
predicted, a highly significant main effect across all three 
designs, in the predicted direction, was revealed for category 
feature typicality. Contrary to predictions, a main effect 
for category feature number was revealed for only one of the 
three combinations of the experimental design. A highly 
significant effect across all three designs, in the predicted 
direction, was revealed for dominance. As predicted, no main 
effect for the experimental control of total feature number 
was revealed. In addition, no significant interactions among 
any of the factors were revealed. 
Dependent Variable 1: The Prototypicalitv Rating for the 
Intended Diagnosis Divided bv the Mean of the Ratings for the 
Nonintended Diagnoses 
Three separate 2 by 2 by 2 repeated measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVA's) were performed for each of the three Design 
Combinations (1+3, 1+2, and 2+3), the levels of which 
are described above. Across all three design combinations, 
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a main effect for typicality was revealed. Consistent with 
the predicted results, the clinicians were significantly more 
likely to rate the hypothetical client as being more 
prototypical of the intended diagnosis, relative to the other 
diagnoses, when the features in the profile were of high 
typicality, compared to when the features were of medium 
typicality. The F and probability values for the typicality 
main effect for each combination of designs are as follows: 
Design Com. 1 + 3, F (1, 222) = 31.516, p < .0001 (Table 4); 
Design Com. 1 + 2, F (1, 218) = 26.203, p < .0001 (Table 5); 
Design Com. 2 + 3, F (1, 216) = 39.715, p < .0001 (Table 6). 
Across both of the two design combinations that included 
dominance as a factor (1 + 3 and 2 + 3) , a main effect for 
dominance was revealed. The clinicians were significantly 
more likely to rate the hypothetical client as being more 
prototypical of the intended diagnosis when the category 
features represented a highly dominant proportion of all the 
features presented relative to when the category features 
represented a less dominant proportion of all the features 
presented. The F and p values for the dominance main effects 
are as follows: 
Design Com. 1 + 3, F (1, 222) = 13.137, p < .0001 (Table 4); 
Design Com. 2 + 3, F (1, 216) = 21.946, p < .0001 (Table 6). 
Although the number of category features was included as 
an independent variable in all three design combinations, a 
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main effect for this variable was revealed only for Design 
Combination 2+3. Subjects were significantly more likely 
to rate the hypothetical client as being more prototypical of 
the intended diagnosis relative to the other diagnoses when 
the profile contained a high number of category features, 
compared to when the profile contained a low number of 
category features, F (1, 216) = 5.616, p = .019 (Table 6). 
As opposed to the other two design combinations, Design 
Combination 2 + 3 was unique in that it kept the exact number 
of category features within each level constant across the two 
designs (see Appendix C) . That is, there were two category 
features in the low category number level of both Designs 2 
and 3, and there were six category features in the high 
category number level of both designs. This fact may explain 
why a significant effect for the number of category features 
was obtained only for Design Combination 2 + 3. 
Consistent with predictions, no main effects nor 
interactions were revealed for total feature number, which 
was included as an experimental control variable in Design 
Combination 2+3. As predicted, this finding was consistent 
across all five dependent variables. Moreover, there were no 
significant interaction effects with any of the experimental 
variables for this, nor any other, dependent variable. 
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Dependent Variable 2: The Prototypicalitv Rating for the 
Modal Diagnosis Divided bv the Mean of the Ratings for the 
Nonmodal Diagnoses 
The second dependent variable was each subject's 
prototypical ity rating of the diagnosis most commonly assigned 
by the clinicians in a given experimental condition, divided 
by the subject's mean typicality rating for the remaining 
nonmodal diagnoses. The results of the three ANOVA's 
performed on the data for the second dependent variable were 
consistent with the results performed on the data for the 
first dependent variable, with the exception that no 
significant main effect was revealed for the category feature 
n u m b e r .  A c r o s s  a l l  t h r e e  D e s i g n  C o m b i n a t i o n s  ( 1 + 3 ,  1 + 2 ,  
and 2+3), the ANOVA's revealed a main effect for feature 
typicality. As predicted, the clinicians were significantly 
more likely to rate the hypothetical client as being more 
prototypical of the modal diagnosis, relative to the other 
diagnoses, when the features in the profile were of high 
typicality, compared to when the features were of medium 
typicality. The F and p values for the typicality main 
effects are as follows: 
Design Com. 1 + 3, F (1, 134) = 9.990, p < .002 (Table 7); 
Design Com. 1 + 2, F (1, 136) = 3.917, p < .050 (Table 8); 
Design Com. 2 + 3, F (1, 154) = 9.849, p < .002 (Table 9). 
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Across both design combinations that included dominance 
as a factor (1 + 3 and 2 + 3), a main effect for dominance 
was revealed. The clinicians were significantly more likely 
to rate the hypothetical client as being more prototypical of 
the modal diagnosis when the category features represented a 
highly dominant proportion of all the features presented 
relative to when the category features represented a less 
dominant proportion of all the features presented. The F and 
p values for the dominance main effects are as follows: 
Design Com. 1 + 3, F (1, 134) = 5.038, p = .026 (Table 7); 
Design Com. 2 + 3, F (1, 154) = 12.342, p = .001 (Table 9). 
As noted above, the three ANOVA's performed on the data 
for this dependent variable revealed no significant main 
effect for number of category features, nor for number of 
total features. Similarly, none of the interaction effects 
approached statistical significance. 
It was predicted that the degree of correspondence 
between the clinicians' modal diagnoses and the intended 
diagnoses would determine whether or not the effects revealed 
for the modal diagnoses would correspond with the effects 
revealed for the intended diagnoses. The extent to which the 
clinicians1 modal diagnoses corresponded with the intended 
diagnoses is discussed in the section of this chapter entitled 
"Dependent variable 5 - Number of Chosen Diagnoses 
Corresponding to the Modal Diagnoses." 
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Dependent Variable 3 - Prototypicalitv Rating for the Chosen 
Diagnosis Divided bv the Mean of the Ratings for the Nonchosen 
Diagnoses 
No significant main effects nor interactions were 
revealed by the three ANOVA's performed upon the data for this 
dependent variable. The subjects' ratings of how prototypical 
the hypothetical client was of the chosen diagnoses were not 
differentially affected by the levels of typicality, 
dominance, category feature number, and total feature number 
(Tables 10, 11, and 12) . Although an effect for feature 
typicality and dominance was revealed for both the intended 
and the modal diagnosis, the typicality and dominance of the 
features associated with the intended diagnosis did not affect 
the clinicians' rating of how prototypical the patient was of 
the chosen diagnosis, relative to the nonchosen diagnoses. 
It was predicted that the degree of correspondence between the 
clinicians' individual chosen diagnoses and the intended 
diagnoses would determine whether or not the effects revealed 
for the chosen diagnoses would correspond with the effects 
revealed for the intended diagnoses. The extent to which the 
clinicians' chosen diagnoses corresponded with the intended 
diagnoses is discussed in the following section. 
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Dependent Variable 4 - Number of Chosen Diagnoses 
Corresponding to the Intended Diagnosis 
Overall, there were a total of 384 cases in which a 
chosen diagnosis could have been provided by the clinicians. 
These 384 cases corresponded to the twelve experimental 
conditions, the four intended diagnoses within each condition, 
and the eight clinicians asked to diagnose the hypothetical 
clients representing each of the four intended diagnoses. Due 
to seven missing cases in which no chosen diagnosis was given 
by the clinicians, 377 of the 384 cases were actually assigned 
a chosen diagnosis. Among these 377 cases in which a chosen 
diagnosis was provided, there were 140 or 37% of the cases in 
which the chosen diagnosis was the same as the intended 
diagnosis. Table 13 presents the number of chosen diagnoses 
that matched each of the four intended diagnoses in each of 
the twelve experimental conditions. There was a maximum of 
eight possible "correct" chosen diagnoses in each 
subcondition, in which the chosen and intended diagnoses could 
match. Due to missing data, however, six of the 48 
subconditions had only seven valid cases, and one subconditon 
had only six valid cases. 
The number of cases in which the chosen diagnosis matched 
the intended diagnosis for each hypothetical client was 
calculated across the four possible intended diagnoses for 
each experimental condition in Designs 1, 2, and 3, and in 
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Design Combinations 1+3, 1 + 2, and 2 + 3 (Tables 14, 15, 
16, and 17, respectively). The chi-square test was judged as 
inappropriate for these data because the assumption of 
independence of observations was not met. That is, each of 
the 32 subjects diagnosed 12 profiles corresponding to the 
each of the 12 experimental conditions. Since the same 
subjects responded to more than one profile, observations 
within the data set were not completely independent of one 
another. An alternative nonparametric test was therefore 
employed. Like the chi-square test, the McNemar test is 
appropriate for nominal data with two samples. Unlike the 
chi-square test, however, the two samples compared in the 
McNemar test can be related. The McNemar test yields a 
statistic that is distributed as chi-square with one degree 
of freedom (Segal, 1956). A discussion of the procedures used 
in the McNemar test is presented in Appendix E. A total of 
nine McNemar tests were performed on the data for this 
dependent variable, and corresponded to each of the 
independent variables that were examined in the three design 
combinations (see Tables 18, 19, 20, and 21). 
A significant main effect was revealed for typicality in 
all three design combinations. As predicted, the clinicians 
were significantly more likely to give diagnoses that 
corresponded to the intended diagnosis when the features of 
the hypothetical client were of high typicality, relative to 
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when they were of medium typicality. The corresponding chi-
square and probability values for the typicality main effect 
for each combination of designs are as follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, X = 22.74, p < .001 (Table 18); 
Design Combination 1+2, X - 14.38, p< .001 (Table 18); 
Design Combination 2+3, X = 31.13, p < .001 (Table 18). 
A significant main effect for dominance was also revealed 
for both design combinations that included dominance as a 
factor. The clinicians were significantly more likely to give 
diagnoses that corresponded to the intended diagnosis when 
there was a high proportion of category features over 
noncategory features, relative to when there was a low 
proportion of category features over noncategory features. 
The corresponding chi-square and probability values for each 
combination of designs are as follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, X = 15.85, p< .001 (Table 19); 
Design Combination 2+3, X = 16.98, p < .001 (Table 19). 
A significant effect for number of category features was 
also revealed, but only for Design Combination 2 + 3. As 
noted above, this was the only combination of designs in which 
the exact number of category features for the two levels of 
this factor was kept constant across the two designs. For 
this design combination, the clinicians were significantly 
more likely to give diagnoses that corresponded to the 
intended diagnosis when there was a high number of category 
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features, relative to when there was a low number of category 
features (Design Combination 2 + 3, X = 5.92, p < .02? Table 
20). As predicted, no significant effects were revealed for 
the total number of both category and noncategory features 
associated with each hypothetical client (Table 21). 
Dependent variable 5 - Number of Chosen Diagnoses 
Corresponding to the Modal Diagnosis 
There were 48 subconditions, corresponding to the four 
intended diagnoses examined within each of the twelve 
experimental conditions. Within each subcondition, there were 
eight clinicians who were asked to diagnose the profile for 
that subcondition. The diagnoses provided by the clinicians 
within each subcondition were examined to determine whether 
or not a modal diagnosis occurred within that subcondition. 
A modal diagnosis was defined simply as a diagnosis that was 
more frequently assigned than any other diagnosis in that 
subcondition. The number of times that a modal diagnosis 
could occur in a given subcondition ranged from two times to 
eight times. For example, as illustrated in Table 13, the 
subcondition for the Antisocial Personality Disorder intended 
diagnosis in the first cell of Design 1 was associated with 
the modal diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Personality 
Disorder. This diagnosis was assigned by four of the eight 
clinicians within that subcondition. Two other clinicians 
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diagnosed the profile as Schizotypal Personality Disorder, and 
the remaining two diagnosed it as Schizoid Personality 
Disorder and as Mixed Personality Disorder, respectively. In 
subconditions in which more than one diagnosis occurred with 
the same frequency and no single diagnosis occurred at a 
higher frequency, no modal diagnosis was determined. 
Table 13 presents the number of chosen diagnoses within 
each of the 48 subconditions that matched the four intended 
diagnoses, as well as the number of chosen diagnoses that 
matched the modal diagnosis for in each subcondition. Among 
the 48 subconditions, a modal diagnosis occurred in only 36 
subconditions. Among the 36 subconditions in which a modal 
diagnosis did occur, there were 17 subconditions in which the 
modal diagnosis matched the intended diagnosis. 
The number of cases in which the chosen diagnosis matched 
the modal diagnosis was calculated across the four possible 
intended diagnoses for each experimental condition in Designs 
1, 2, and 3, and in Design Combinations 1+3, 1+2, and 2 
+ 3 (Tables 22, 23, 24, and 25, respectively). Consistent 
with the procedure described above, a total of nine McNemar 
tests were performed on the number of chosen diagnoses that 
corresponded to the modal diagnosis (see Tables 26, 27, 28, 
and 29) . These analyses revealed a pattern of results similar 
to the results found when the intended diagnosis was used as 
the standard for comparison. The pattern of results differed, 
81 
however, in that only three of the nine analyses (as opposed 
to six of the nine analyses above) yielded significant 
effects. Moreover, the magnitude of the effects was smaller 
relative to when the intended diagnosis was used as the 
standard for comparison. A significant effect for typicality 
was revealed across two of the three combinations of designs 
(1 + 3 and 2 + 3) . For these two design combinations, the 
clinicians were significantly more likely to give diagnoses 
that corresponded to the modal diagnosis when the features of 
the hypothetical client were of high typicality, relative to 
when they were of medium typicality. The corresponding chi-
square and probability values for each combination of designs 
are as follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, X = 4.05, p < .05 (Table 26); 
Design Combination 2+3, X = 5.76, p < .02 (Table 26). 
A significant main effect for dominance was also 
revealed, but only for the Design Combination 2 + 3. For this 
combination of designs, the clinicians were significantly more 
likely to give diagnoses that corresponded to the modal 
diagnosis when there was a high proportion of category 
features over noncategory features, relative to when there was 
a low proportion of category features over noncategory 
features (Design Combination 2 + 3, X = 4.97, p < .05; Table 
27) . No significant effects were revealed for number of 
category features, nor for number of total features for any 
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of the three design combinations (Tables 28 and 29, 
respectively). 
As an additional measure, the data were also visually 
inspected using the more stringent criteria that the chosen 
diagnoses (a) match the intended diagnosis, and (b) be agreed 
upon by at least half of the clinicians in a given 
subcondition. There were 13 subconditions in which the 
diagnosis matched the intended diagnosis and was also assigned 
by at least 50% of the clinicians within that subcondition. 
These subconditions are underlined in Table 13. Note that the 
exact number of clinicians that represented 50% of the 
clinicians in a subcondition varied across the subconditions 
due to missing data for seven of the 48 subconditions. Within 
these 13 subconditions, 61% of the chosen diagnoses matched 
the intended diagnosis and were agreed upon by at least half 
of the clinicians in that subcondition. Table 30 presents the 
data on a more molar scale, for each of the twelve 
experimental conditions, collapsed across intended diagnosis. 
Even more striking than the data presented in Table 22 for the 
number of chosen diagnoses simply matching the modal 
diagnoses, a visual inspection of the data in Table 30 reveals 
that both category feature typicality and dominance strongly 
influenced the number of chosen diagnoses that matched the 
intended diagnosis and were agreed upon by at least half of 
the clinicians in that subcondition. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Verbal specifications of categories of phenomena can 
enhance the effectiveness of one's behavior with respect to 
those phenomena. Psychodiagnostic classification systems are 
verbal specifications of categories of maladaptive behavioral 
phenomena. These classification systems are designed with the 
goal of enhancing the clinicianfs ability to assess and treat 
these phenomena effectively. To the extent that the 
categories specified in diagnostic nosologies correspond to 
functionally meaningful subtypes of psychopathology, the 
reliability and validity with which clinicians apply the DSM 
diagnoses is enhanced. There is wide agreement in the field 
of clinical psychopathology that the utility of diagnostic 
categories was enhanced with the evolution from the second 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-II; American Psychiatric Association, 1968) to 
the third edition of this manual (DSM-III; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1980) as the standard for psychiatric 
nomenclature (Klerman, 1986; Millon, 1986). 
Whereas the DSM-II was based on a monothetic model of 
categorization, the DSM-III was based on a polythetic model 
of categorization. Monothetic categories specify a list of 
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necessary and sufficient criteria for category membership. 
Polythetic categories also specify a list of criteria, but 
require that only a certain number of those criteria be met 
for category membership. It has been suggested that the 
existing polythetic categories of DSM-III-R be further refined 
according to a prototype model in future psychiatric 
nosologies, at least for the personality disorder categories 
(Millon, 1986). The prototype model is essentially an 
alternative method of distinguishing important differences 
between actually continuous categories by emphasizing clear 
cases, rather than boundaries between categories. The 
prototype model is particularly applicable to the 
categorization of the personality disorders, given the 
heterogeneity of individual members of any one category, as 
well as the overlap between individual members diagnosed with 
other personality disorders. The prototype model does not 
specify a set of necessary and sufficient category features, 
but rather specifies the extent to which category features are 
prototypical of a particular personality disorder. 
The incorporation of the prototype model into a 
diagnostic classification system might enhance the relatively 
low diagnostic reliability that has generally been associated 
with the personality disorders compared to Axis I disorders. 
Highly prototypical cases may be diagnosed with greater 
reliability relative to less prototypical cases. Under the 
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current system of discrete present-or-absent judgments, 
however, the effects of prototypicality on diagnostic 
reliability are not acknowledged. A classification scheme 
based on a prototype model would explicitly predict a 
relationship between reliability and prototypicality. Under 
such a system, low diagnostic reliability would not 
necessarily be taken to indicate clinician error, since 
atypical cases would be expected to yield lower agreement than 
more typical cases. Moreover, two clinicians might agree that 
a given case is characteristic of two personality disorder 
categories, but they might differ in their categorical 
judgments of which of the two is the best single diagnosis for 
the case. Under the present system of all-or-nothing labels, 
the clinicians would appear to disagree completely. If 
prototypicality ratings of the two categories were used, 
however, considerable agreement would be revealed. 
In order to move toward a useful psychodiagnostic system 
based on a prototype model, it is critical to understand the 
factors that impact clinicians' diagnostic judgments. The 
purpose of the present study was to examine how the features 
associated with particular personality disorders, as well as 
how the contexts in which those features are presented, impact 
clinicians* diagnostic judgments. Subjects were presented 
with brief descriptions of 12 hypothetical clients. 
Information as to the sex of the client, which might have 
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affected the clinicians' use of particular diagnostic 
categories, was not provided. The subjects were instructed 
to quantify their judgments of how prototypical each 
hypothetical client was of each of the 11 personality 
disorders specified in the DSM-III. The subjects were also 
asked to diagnose the hypothetical client with one of the 
personality disorders. A measure of how prototypical the 
hypothetical client was of the intended, chosen, or modal 
diagnosis for that condition was determined in proportion to 
how prototypical the client was of the other diagnoses. This 
dependent variable was judged to be particularly compatible 
with the prototype model. 
The descriptions of each of the hypothetical clients were 
developed from previous experimental data as to the typicality 
and distinctiveness of features associated with each of the 
personality disorders. These data were kindly provided to the 
investigator by Dr. John Livesley (1986a, 1986b) of the 
University of British Columbia for incorporation into the 
client descriptions that were used in the present study. 
These data were used to generate 48 client profiles. Each of 
the profiles contained features that were associated with the 
particular personality disorder category which that particular 
profile was intended by the investigator to portray. These 
features are referred to as "category features." Each of the 
profiles also contained features that were associated with 
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other personality disorder categories which that particular 
profile was not intended to portray. These features are 
referred to as "noncategory features." The 12 client profiles 
were designed such that the impact of three factors upon the 
diagnostic process used by the clinicians could be examined. 
Each of the three factors represented a dimension along which 
either the features themselves, or the contexts in which they 
were presented were varied. 
The first experimental factor was feature typicality. 
The typicality of each of the individual category features 
within each profile was varied at either a high' or a medium 
level. The levels of high and medium, as opposed to high and 
low, were selected for two reasons. One was that the 
noncategory features were of low typicality. Thus, it was 
necessary to present category features of at least medium 
typicality in order to obtain a sufficient contrast with the 
low typicality noncategory features. Additionally, the high 
versus medium typicality conditions were selected to reduce 
the contrast between the typicality conditions. This was 
expected to reduce the likelihood that a highly robust main 
effect for typicality would override other main effects or 
any interactions among the independent variables. The second 
experimental factor was the number of features associated with 
a given personality disorder in proportion to the total number 
of features presented, and was varied at either a high or a 
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low level. This proportion is referred to as the dominance 
of the category features over the total number of features, 
in which the total number of features consists of both 
category and noncategory features. Third, the number of the 
category features included in each profile for the intended 
personality disorder was varied as either high or low. In 
addition, as an experimental control, the number of total 
features in each profile was adjusted such that any potential 
effects of dominance upon the diagnostic process could be 
discerned from the influence of total feature number. 
Moreover, as an additional experimental control, the 
proportion of category features that were unique to the 
particular personality disorder category portrayed in each 
profile over the category features that were shared by other 
personality disorder categories was kept constant across all 
conditions. The necessity of this control was highlighted by 
a previous study demonstrating that feature distinctiveness 
impacts clinicians' prototypicality judgments (Boykin, 1987). 
Boykin (1987) found that the factors of category feature 
typicality and category feature distinctiveness both had 
strong effects upon clinicians' prototypicality ratings of 
the personality disorders. 
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Overview of Hypotheses and Results 
On the basis of past research, it was hypothesized that 
both feature typicality and feature number would have a strong 
impact upon the diagnostic process. Specifically, personality 
descriptions containing highly typical category features were 
hypothesized to be associated with higher measures of 
diagnostic reliability, diagnostic accuracy, and 
prototypicality compared with personality descriptions 
containing relatively low typical category features. 
Similarly, personality descriptions containing a high number 
of category features were hypothesized to be associated with 
higher measures of diagnostic reliability, diagnostic 
accuracy, and prototypicality relative to personality 
descriptions containing a low number of category features. 
Based upon past research, it was predicted that the 
variables of feature typicality and feature number would be 
so powerful that they might mask any effects of dominance. 
Therefore, a main effect for dominance was predicted only upon 
the condition that enough variance would be spared by what 
were hypothesized to be the highly significant main effects 
for feature typicality and feature number. In this case it 
was predicted that personality descriptions containing a high 
proportion of category features to noncategory features would 
be associated with higher measures of prototypicality, 
diagnostic accuracy, and diagnostic reliability compared with 
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personality descriptions containing a low proportion of 
category features. 
in general, the experimental results provided support 
for the above hypotheses, but with a few exceptions. As 
predicted, a highly significant main effect across all three 
designs, in the predicted direction, was revealed for category 
feature typicality. Contrary to predictions, a main effect 
for category feature number was revealed for only one of the 
three combinations of the experimental design. A highly 
significant effect across all three designs, in the predicted 
direction, was revealed for dominance. As predicted, no main 
effect for the experimental control of total feature number 
was revealed. In addition, no significant interactions among 
any of the factors were revealed. 
Category Feature Typicality 
The results of the present study for typicality are 
consistent with those of Boykin (1987) in that the typicality 
of the features associated with the intended diagnosis 
strongly affected the clinicians' rating of how prototypical 
the patient was of the intended diagnosis, as well as the 
"accuracy" of their diagnostic judgments. These results are 
also consistent with those of Cantor and Mischel (1980), who 
found a strong main effect for feature typicality. Note, 
however, that unlike the present study and that of Boykin 
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(1987), Cantor and Mischel (1980) did not actually vary the 
degree of typicality of each individual feature. Rather, they 
created three levels of typicality by varying the number of 
features associated with prototypes of disorders agreed upon 
by 13 clinicians, resulting in an effect due to both 
typicality and number. In the present study, however, the 
effects of feature typicality and feature number upon the 
diagnostic process were assessed independently. 
The present study was the first to examine the effect of 
the typicality of the features associated with the intended 
diagnosis upon clinicians1 judgments of how prototypical the 
client was of the modal diagnosis for that condition, 
relative to the nonmodal diagnoses (dep. variable #2) . 
Although a strong main effect was revealed, it was not as 
powerful as the effect for the intended diagnosis. This was 
because the modal diagnosis for a given condition did not 
always correspond to the intended diagnosis. Recall that 
there were 48 subconditions, corresponding to the four 
intended diagnoses within each of the 12 experimental 
conditions. In 12 of the 48 subconditions, no single modal 
diagnosis was revealed. That is, there was not sufficient 
consensus in these subconditions for a single modal diagnosis 
to emerge. For example, of the eight subjects in a 
subcondition, three might have chosen diagnosis A, three might 
have chosen diagnosis B, and the remaining two might have 
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chosen diagnoses c and D. Since no single diagnosis received 
more "votes" than the other diagnoses, no modal diagnosis was 
obtained for the present purposes. Among the 36 subconditions 
in which a modal diagnosis did occur, the modal diagnosis was 
equivalent to the intended diagnosis in 17 conditions. 
Although a main effect of category feature typicality 
was revealed for both the intended and the modal diagnosis, 
the typicality of the features associated with the intended 
diagnosis did not affect the clinicians1 rating of how 
prototypical the patient was of the chosen diagnosis, relative 
to the nonchosen diagnoses (dep. variable #3). This pattern 
reflects the fact that overall only 37% of the chosen 
diagnoses were the same as the intended diagnoses. 
Interestingly, even when the clinicians "misdiagnosed" a 
profile relative to the intended diagnosis, their 
prototypicality ratings of the intended diagnosis were still 
influenced by the typicality of the features associated with 
the intended diagnosis. 
Behaviorally, the typicality of a stimulus may be viewed 
as the strength of that stimulus to function discriminatively 
in relation to the response of making a particular diagnosis. 
Features associated with a given personality disorder category 
have, in the past, been differentially associated with 
reinforcing consequences when that diagnosis was made. In a 
clinician's past, colleagues have praised diagnostic judgments 
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in the presence of certain features, and have withheld 
approval or even punished the same judgments in the presence 
of other features. Similarly, the response of making a 
certain diagnostic judgment in the presence of certain 
features may have led to more effective intervention relative 
to when that judgment was made in the presence of other 
features. In either case, the former features have acquired 
a discriminative function. Of course, this process is not an 
either-or phenomenon, as stimuli may vary widely in their 
degree of association with the behavior-reinforcer 
contingency. The present results suggest similarities in the 
learning histories of many practicing clinicians in that 
certain features have been more consistently associated with 
diagnostic judgments that were reinforced relative to other 
features. 
The strong effects for typicality in the present study 
as well as in prior research underscores the importance of 
incorporating features of prototype models in psychodiagnostic 
nosologies. Even the existing polythetic personality disorder 
categories of DSM-III-R, although vastly improved relative to 
earlier monothetic systems, are based on the assumption of 
equal importance of the category features. For example, in 
the case of Borderline Personality Disorder, the DSM-III-R 
requires that any five of a list of eight symptoms be present. 
The present results suggest that some symptoms are much more 
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critical to the diagnostic process than others, and this 
variability must be taken into account if the utility of the 
diagnostic system is to be maximized. 
Dominance of Category Features Over Total Features 
Consistent with the results for category feature 
typicality, dominance had a powerful effect upon clinician's 
prototypicality judgments of how relatively prototypical the 
patient was of the intended diagnosis (dep. variable #1), a 
lesser effect upon judgments of the modal diagnosis (dep. 
variable #2), and no effect upon judgments of the chosen 
diagnosis (dep. variable #3) . Although this was the first 
study to examine the independent effect of dominance in a 
factorial design, the present findings are consistent with 
those of Cantor (1978). She found that a breadth-dominance-
differentiation index of each character profile was highly 
positively correlated with subjects' prototypicality ratings 
of that character. Although Cantor's "index" included 
dominance, it was confounded with other factors (breadth and 
differentiation). It is therefore impossible to conclude if 
dominance per se was responsible for the observed effects. 
The present results are also consistent with those of Rosch 
and Mervis (1975), who found that the number of noncategory 
features included in the presentation of category features 
was highly negatively correlated with clinicians* 
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prototypicality ratings of the overall feature combination. 
The highly significant main effect for dominance in the 
present study supports Livesley's (1985a, 1985b) hypothesis 
that a negative correlation exists between the number of 
competing features and measures of prototypicality. The 
current findings do contradict the findings of some related 
studies, however (Blashfield, Sprock, Haymaker, & Hodgin, 
1989; Horowitz, Post, French, Wallis, & Siegalman, 1981a). 
Horowitz et al. (1981a) found that a high number of 
prototypical category features was associated with high 
diagnostic reliability, but that a high versus low number of 
"irrelevant" features was not differentially associated with 
diagnostic reliability. These features, however, were not 
competing features, but rather, were "irrelevant" features 
that were not descriptive of other diagnostic categories. 
Blashfield et al. (1989) found a positive correlation between 
diagnostic reliability and number of category features, but 
no correlation between diagnostic reliability and the number 
of competing features from other personality disorders. This 
finding, however, may be due in part to the fact that the 
authors did not control for the typicality and distinctiveness 
of the individual noncategory features, as well as the 
dominance of the category features in proportion to the total 
number of category and noncategory features. 
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In the present study, the dominance of category features 
in proportion to the number of total features had a much more 
critical role in the diagnostic process than did the absolute 
number of category features or the number of total features. 
Even when the clinicians "misdiagnosed" a profile relative to 
the intended diagnosis, their prototypicality ratings of the 
intended diagnosis were still influenced by the dominance of 
the intended category features. Such a powerful effect for 
dominance was unexpected, and raises an interesting 
theoretical point. The high versus low dominance conditions 
contained the same amount of information about the category 
features themselves; both conditions included the same number 
of category features, and the same level of typicality of the 
category features. If only the presence of certain category 
features were critical to the diagnostic process, then no 
dominance effect would have occurred. The strong dominance 
effect in the present study suggests that the same information 
as to the typicality, number, and distinctiveness of the 
category features can have very different effects upon the 
diagnostic process as a function of the total context in which 
the information is portrayed. Behaviorally, category features 
are viewed as discriminative stimuli in the presence of which 
certain diagnostic responses have been reinforced in the past. 
Relative to the high dominance conditions, the low dominance 
conditions were characterized by additional stimuli that 
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interfered with the controlling relation between key 
discriminative stimuli and the corresponding diagnostic 
behavior. 
The strong dominance effect in the present study 
contradicts the generally accepted clinical lore that the more 
assessment information clinicians gather, the more in touch 
they are with the most important pathognomonic features of 
their clients. A clinician's assessment behavior may or may 
not be in touch with contingencies that have in the past 
resulted in effective and expedient diagnosis, assessment, and 
treatment of clients' maladaptive behavior patterns. Of 
course, detailed assessment for the purpose of monitoring the 
effectiveness of treatment is likely to be quite useful. Some 
clinicians, however, may engage in assessment for assessment's 
sake, and develop intricate historical accounts of their 
clients' maladaptive behavior patterns. Some of these more 
subtle behavior patterns are likely to be associated with 
contrasting diagnostic categories. Although such historical 
accounts may be quite interesting in capturing the subtleties 
of a client's behavior, they may encourage both the clinician 
and client to lose sight of the features of a client's 
behavior that are the most indicative of procedures leading 
to effective assessment and treatment. Not only can 
assessment for assessment's sake reach a point of diminishing 
returns, it can also mask the importance of highly typical, 
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distinctive, and numerous features that would otherwise be 
critical to effective diagnosis, assessment, and treatment. 
The strong effect for dominance in the present study is 
consistent with Rosch's probabilistic concept of cue validity, 
which holds that "the validity of a given cue x as a predictor 
of a given category y (the conditional probability of y/x) 
increases as the frequency with which cue x is associated with 
category y increases and decreases as the frequency with which 
cue x is associated with categories other than y increases" 
(Rosch, 1978, pp. 30-31). The dominance effect in the present 
study attests to the powerful impact that features from 
competing personality disorders can have upon the diagnostic 
process. The strong effect for dominance in the present study 
is also consistent with Cantor and Genero's (1986) suggestion 
that the diagnostic process involves simultaneously 
determining what a clinical phenomenon is and what it is not. 
Thus, the process of diagnosing a personality disorder, for 
example, must determine not only "what it is," along some 
gradient of stimulus dimensions, but must also involve a 
discrimination between "what it is " and "what it is not." 
In fact, the Greek roots of "diagnosis" (dia - meaning both 
"through" and "apart," and gno - meaning "to perceive" or "to 
know") reveal the word as a metaphor for the simultaneous 
processes of "perceiving through" a phenomenon to the 
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essential core of "what it is" and of "perceiving" the 
phenomenon "apart" from other phenomena. 
Number of Category Features 
The fact that the number of category features 
significantly affected the clinicians' prototypicality 
judgments for the intended diagnosis (dep. variable 1) in only 
one of the three combinations of the experimental designs may 
be due to the fact that this combination was unique in that 
it kept the exact number of category features within each 
level constant across the two designs (see Appendix C, Design 
Combination 2 + 3) . That is, there were two category features 
in the low category number level of both Designs 2 and 3, and 
there were six category features in the high category number 
level of both designs. In contrast, for the other two Design 
Combinations, the exact number of features in the high vs. low 
levels differed across the two designs that comprised the 
combination. This difference may have contributed extraneous 
variance to the category number effect for these two Design 
Combinations, thereby reducing the likelihood of a significant 
effect. In any case, the effects for number of category 
features were clearly weaker than predicted. 
The present results and those of Boykin (1987) both 
contradict the general conclusion in the prototype literature 
that category feature number is the most critical determinant 
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of the diagnostic process. The present finding of only 
limited effects of the number of category features is 
consistent with Boykin's finding that even if category feature 
number is experimentally controlled, other qualities of the 
category features, such as typicality and distinctiveness, 
significantly affect clinicians' prototypicality judgments. 
As Boykin (1987, p. 80) concluded, "which attributes are in 
the body of information, not just how many of them there are, 
is also important in the diagnostic process." Boykin had 
controlled for category feature number in his study upon the 
basis of previous research demonstrating the importance of 
category feature number in determining the outcome of the 
diagnostic process (specifically, Cantor and Mischel, 1980). 
A review of this and the other studies on the importance of 
category feature number (Blashfield et al., 1989; Horowitz et 
al., 1981a; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), however, reveals that the 
category features that were used in these studies had already 
been judged to be of very high typicality. Therefore, rather 
that simply varying the number of category features, these 
studies varied the number of highly prototypical category 
features. This process precluded an analysis of the separate 
effects of feature number and feature typicality. Yet, the 
highly significant effect for number of highly prototypical 
features was attributed, in each of the studies, to category 
feature number, rather than to feature typicality. An 
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advantage of the present study, like that of Boykin (1987) , 
is that it utilized previous data regarding feature typicality 
and distinctiveness (Livesley, 1986a, 1986b) , thereby enabling 
an examination of the effects of other qualities of category 
features independent of those related to category feature 
number. 
The limited impact of category feature number in the 
present study may be due in part to the strong effects of 
feature typicality. Each of the personality disorder 
categories are characterized by one, two, or in some cases 
three very highly prototypical features. It may be that when 
these features are present the diagnosis will generally made, 
and the number of additional features becomes largely 
irrelevant. This interpretation must be made with caution, 
however, given the lack of interaction effects in the present 
study. Relative to the effects of category feature number, 
the effects of category feature typicality, distinctiveness, 
and dominance has not been given sufficient attention in the 
majority of prior investigations. On the basis of the current 
findings it is concluded that although category feature number 
can play a significant role in determining the outcome of the 
diagnostic process, other qualities of the category features 
themselves, as well as the context of all the features with 
which they are presented, are at least as important. 
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Total Number of Features 
The inclusion of low versus high total feature number in 
this study is comparable to some degree to Cantor and 
Mischel*s (1980) contrast between situations in which 
diagnosticians have a "restricted view" versus a "full view" 
of a client. Cantor and Mischel (1980) hypothesized that in 
the "restricted view," when the diagnostician has only a 
limited amount of information, the typicality of the observed 
features would be of particular importance. The authors 
hypothesized that in the "full view," however, when the 
diagnostician has more information, the number of observed 
features would be of particular importance. In the present 
study, the total number of features of the hypothetical client 
was varied at an either high or low level, corresponding 
roughly to Cantor and Mischel's notion of restricted vs. full 
views, respectively. The fact that the total number of 
features did not significantly affect the clinicians' 
diagnostic process does not lend support to the hypothesis 
that feature typicality and feature number are differentially 
important to the diagnostic process under restricted versus 
full view conditions. 
This factor was included primarily in order to ensure 
that any effects attributed to dominance would not be due to 
total feature number. The null effects of total feature 
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number support the conclusion that the effects of dominance 
described above are in fact due to that variable. 
Strengths and Limitations 
Many of the strengths of the present study have been 
discussed above. These include an experimental design 
permitting the disambiguation of the effects of category 
feature number, typicality, and dominance. Other strengths 
include the examination of correspondence of chosen diagnoses 
with both intended and modal diagnoses, the independent 
assessment of both diagnostic accuracy and prototypicality 
ratings, and the examination of prototypicality ratings for 
each disorder within the context of the prototypicality 
ratings for other disorders. In addition to examining the 
context in which the category features were presented, the 
proportion dependent variable is compatible with the prototype 
model in that, unlike the previous measure that combines 
accuracy and prototypicality (Boykin, 1987), it is not based 
upon the assumption that a feature's prototypicality of one 
category is on a continuum with its prototypicality of other 
categories. Moreover, by combining the prototypicality 
ratings for a given category with those for other categories, 
the proportional dependent measure takes a greater amount of 
the variability in the data into account. Additionally, the 
proportional dependent variable resulted in data that were 
104 
normally, rather than bimodally distributed, thereby allowing 
for the use of more powerful parametric statistical analysis 
as opposed to nonparametric analyses. 
The strengths of the study that specifically enhanced 
its external validity were the use of licensed, doctoral-
level, practicing clinicians as' subjects. Additionally, 
clinicians were given an open-choice format for diagnosis 
within the specified realm of the personality disorders. In 
comparison to the more restricted format of only four possible 
diagnoses used in Boykin's (1987) study, however, the present 
study's more open-ended format increased the variability in 
the chosen diagnoses and decreased the probability of 
diagnostic accuracy and reliability. 
The weaknesses of the study are primarily related to 
limitations in external validity. These include the use of 
paragraph-length descriptions of hypothetical clients, as 
opposed to videotaped vignettes of hypothetical clients, or 
preferably edited videotapes of actual clients. Along these 
lines, the features within the client profiles were not 
descriptions of actual behaviors, but rather were descriptions 
of personality traits. Personality traits are themselves 
functional categories of behavioral patterns. Had they been 
available, data on the typicality of behaviors (Livesley, 
1986a, 1986b) would have been preferable to use in place of 
the data on the typicality of traits. Additionally, the fact 
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that the study was conducted through the mail, rather than in 
person, may have decreased to some extent the clinicians' 
ability to comply with the experimental instructions, such as 
completing all of the profiles one after another in an 
uninterrupted time period. This weakness, however, may be 
outweighed by the fact that the sample of clinicians willing 
to participate in a study of this nature was possibly more 
representative of the population of practicing clinicians than 
would have been a sample of clinicians who had self-selected 
to participate in a study that required an appointment with 
the investigator during regular work hours. Note, however, 
that only 25% of the clinicians who were solicited agreed to 
participate in the study. It is possible that the data 
provided by these self-selected subjects may have been 
somewhat different from the data that would have been provided 
by a more representative sample that included both clinicians 
who were interested in participating in such studies, as well 
as clinicians who were not interested in such studies. 
An additional weakness of the study is that in an attempt 
to include noncategory features from the 10 noncategory 
personality disorders, and to control for the typicality, 
number, and distinctiveness of those features, some of the 
profiles included features that were somewhat contradictory 
to one another. Relative to the hypothetical clients with 
more consistent features, the few hypothetical clients with 
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contradictory features may have seemed less representative of 
actual clients. 
Directions for Future Research 
The findings of the present study, as well as those of 
Boykin (1987), attest to the utility of the present 
methodology for studying factors affecting the diagnostic 
process. Despite its analogue nature, this methodology allows 
for the disambiguation of the effects of factors that are 
otherwise difficult to tease apart. One avenue for future 
research would be to increase the external validity of the 
present methodology by using videotapes of actual or 
dramatized clients, rather than lists of traits. For example, 
one could utilize previous data on the typicality and 
distinctiveness of actual behaviors (Livesley, 1986a, 1986b) 
for each of the personality disorders to develop scripts for 
videotapes of dramatized clients. It may also be possible to 
develop videotapes of edited segments with actual clients, 
although this would be more difficult. The exact content of 
the videotapes would, of course, have to be carefully checked 
by raters. In a procedure similar to that employed by 
Herbert, Nelson, and Herbert (1988), after viewing each 
videotape, clinicians could also note on a behavior checklist 
behaviors that they either did or did not observe, with 
corresponding ratings of how prototypical each behavior was 
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of the chosen diagnosis. The correspondence between the 
accuracy with which clinicians observed behaviors associated 
with DSM criteria could also be compared with the clinicians' 
diagnostic accuracy. This study would also allow for a 
comparison between Livesley's (1986a, 1986b) data on feature 
typicality and the clinicians' prototypicality ratings of each 
of the videotaped behaviors for the chosen diagnosis. 
Another interesting avenue for future research within 
the personality disorders is the issue of cross-situational 
consistency and temporal stability. Along with the factors 
in the present study, one could examine the effect of cross-
situational consistency upon clinicians' prototypicality 
ratings. Clinicians could observe either consistent or 
inconsistent behavior of hypothetical clients in role-play 
situations. Additionally, as a variation of a study by Cantor 
(1978) , clinicians could observe hypothetical clients engaging 
in behaviors that were highly typical of particular 
personality disorders in situations in which such behavior 
was normative versus situations in which the behavior was not 
normative. Perhaps of even greater interest, one could cross 
the factor of normative versus non-normative behavior with a 
factor of effective versus ineffective behavior. Clinicians 
could observe videotaped segments of a hypothetical client 
engaging in behaviors that were highly typical of a given 
personality disorder in situations in which such behaviors 
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were effective, and also in situations in which the behaviors 
were not effective. The following factors have now been 
empirically demonstrated to be important to the diagnostic 
process: typicality, dominance, distinctiveness, and category 
feature number. Regardless of methodological details, future 
studies that investigate any of these factors should 
sufficiently control for the other factors. 
Clinical Implications 
The present study holds several important clinical 
implications, many of which relate to the development and 
evaluation of future versions of the DSM. First, given the 
strong effect for feature typicality and the relatively weak 
effect for feature number, future versions of the DSM need to 
place greater emphasis on the typicality of the criterion 
features that a client portrays as opposed to the current 
emphasis on the number of criterion features that a client 
portrays. For example, a system in which features were 
weighted for typicality could be empirically-derived. 
Research is needed to determine whether or not the increased 
specificity and reliability that might result from such a 
modification would outweigh the increased cumbersomeness that 
the system would entail. 
The fact that clinicians* prototypicality ratings were 
significantly affected by how typical the category features 
109 
were of the intended diagnosis, even in cases when diagnostic 
accuracy was low, suggests that future versions of the DSM 
would do well to encourage clinicians to attend more to the 
prototypicality ratings of the personality disorders, rather 
than the current categorical yes-no diagnostic format. 
Moreover, the main effect for dominance suggests that 
clinicians need to be careful not to carry out their 
assessments in so much detail that they end up attending to 
too many low typical noncategory, or irrelevant features, 
thereby decreasing the salience of the key category features. 
Research utilizing videotaped profiles could lead to an 
empirically-derived training procedure in which individual 
clinicians could compare their prototypicality ratings and 
diagnoses for videotaped client dramatizations with those of 
clinicians known in the field for their diagnostic expertise 
with particular personality disorders. Computerized training 
programs could be devised to accompany videotapes of 
dramatized clients who had previously been judged to be more 
or less prototypical of specific personality disorders. The 
training programs could allow the clinician to pause the 
videotape in order to rate the prototypical ity of key 
behaviors for the various personality disorders, and to 
compare these ratings to those of recognized experts in the 
field. Such programs and videotapes could be included as part 
of a training kit to accompany future versions of the DSM. 
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Clearly, much work remains to be done in this relatively 
new area. In addition to increasing the utility of our 
psychodiagnostic classification systems, such work will 
hopefully enhance our understanding of the process of verbal 
categorization in general. 
Ill 
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Solicitation Letter 
Dear 
I am a doctoral candidate in the clinical psychology 
program at UNCG. I am conducting a dissertation research 
project that depends upon the participation of practicing 
doctoral level clinical and counseling psychologists. The 
study is not a test of clinicians* knowledge. Rather, it is 
a survey of clinicians' own impressions of the personality 
disorders, based upon their experience with actual clients. 
The survey is designed to take no longer than one hour. 
Moreover, because the materials can be mailed to each 
participating clinician, the study can be completed at home, 
rather than during regular office hours. This study has been 
fully reviewed and approved by both my departmental 
dissertation committee and the Human Subjects Review Committee 
at UNCG. It has been judged to satisfy the American 
Psychological Association's ethical guidelines, and there is 
no misinformation or discomfort involved. Each individual 
participant's responses will be kept strictly confidential. 
I am contacting you to ask if you would be willing to 
participate in this study. We are seeking participating 
clinicians who have been permanently licensed for at least 3 
years, who work primarily with adults, and whose current 
clinical activities include the diagnosis of clients with 
personality disorders. Enclosed is a self-addressed, stamped 
postcard for your reply. If you agree to participate, you 
will receive a packet of information containing a 
paragraph-length personality profile for each of 12 
hypothetical clients. You will be asked to provide your 
impressions of each client's diagnostic picture, based upon 
your experience with actual clients. 
If you have any questions about the study, please do not 
hesitate to contact me or my dissertation chairperson, 
Rosemery 0. Nelson, Ph.D., at the UNCG Psychology Department, 
(919) 334-5013. We believe that by tapping the clinical 
experience of practicing psychologists, this study will have 
important implications for an improved understanding of the 
personality disorders, and the variables that lead to their 
diagnosis. We hope to publish the study's findings and 
implications, while maintaining the confidentiality of 
individual data. 
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Recalling your own years as a graduate student, I am sure 
you know how grateful I would be if you would agree to 
participate in this study. Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Diana L. Herbert, M.A. Rosemery O. Nelson, Ph.D. 
Doctoral Candidate Dissertation Chairperson 
enc. 
Response Form 
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Please take a moment to indicate your reply: 
NAME: 
( ) YES, I would like to participate in your study. I 
understand that I will receive the materials for the 
study by mail, and that the survey is designed to take 
about 45 minutes. 
( ) I have been permanently licensed for at least 3 years. 
( ) I work primarily with adult clients. 
( ) My current clinical activities include the diagnosis of 
personality disorders. 
( ) SORRY, but I will not be able to participate in your 
study. 
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Follow UP Letter to Participants 
Dear 
I am very grateful that you have agreed to participate 
in my dissertation research. This study is designed to take 
approximately 1 hour, and may be completed at home, rather 
than during your regular office hours. This study has been 
approved by my dissertation committee and by our department's 
Human Subjects Review Committee. It involves no 
misinformation, risk, or discomfort. If you have any further 
questions concerning the study, please do not hesitate to call 
me or my dissertation chairperson, Dr. Rosemery 0. Nelson, at 
the UNCG Psychology Department, (919) 334-5013. 
So that your individual responses can be kept strictly 
confidential, they will be identified only by a code number. 
This code number is already written on each of your data 
sheets. Only the primary investigator, Diana Herbert, has 
access to the list matching subject code numbers and names. 
This list will only be used to note whether or not each 
participant's data have been received. To ensure the 
confidentiality of your data, please do not write your name 
on the actual data sheets. 
Before beginning the study, please read, sign, and date 
the enclosed consent form. Please try to complete the entire 
survey uninterrupted, and within one week of receiving this 
packet. Once all the participants have returned their 
responses, you will receive a debriefing statement, explaining 
the exact nature of this study. A summary of the general 
experimental results will also be mailed to you as soon as 
they are available. Thank you for your support in this 
proj ect. 
Sincerely, 
Diana Herbert, M.A. Rosemery O. Nelson, Ph.D. 
Doctoral Candidate Dissertation Chairperson 
enc. 
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Consent Form 
I agree to participate in the present investigation on 
psychological assessment with the understanding that I will 
be free to terminate my participation at any time. I 
understand that the information I provide in this study will 
be assigned an anonymous subject identification number and 
will be treated as confidential material. I have been 
informed as to the nature of the experimental procedures. I 
understand that I will be assigning diagnoses and 
prototypicality ratings to a series of case profiles. I 
understand that the present investigation is in no way meant 
to represent an evaluation of my diagnostic skills, but is 
instead a survey of practicing clinicians' clinical 
impressions. I understand that I will be fully debriefed as 
to the details of the study as soon as I mail the enclosed 
materials back to the principal investigator. 
Signature: 
Date: 
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Instruction Sheet 
(Please read this sheet before you begin the survey.) 
General Instructions: 
1. On the pages that follow, you will be asked to read a 
paragraph-length personality profile for each of 8 
hypothetical clients. Note that all of the clients are 
adults. The features that are decribed in the profiles for 
each client are inflexible and maladaptive. These features 
interfere significantly with the client's social or 
occupational functioning and cause subjective distress. They 
are representative of the client's current and long-term 
functioning, and they are not limited to episodes of illness. 
2. All too often the descriptions of disorders in diagnostic 
systems are not based upon empirical data from the valuable 
resource of practicing clinicians' experience. This study is 
designed to tap the clinical experience of "on-line" 
clinicians like yourself, independent of the information in 
existing diagnostic systems. Therefore, please remember that 
this study is specifically not a test of how your knowledge 
corresponds to diagnostic manuals or other sources. Rather, 
it is a survey of vour own current impressions and 
preferences, based upon your clinical experience with actual 
clients. We are interested in vour personal impressions of 
how typical or atypical the hypothetical clients are of the 
various personality disorders. Thus, we ask that you not 
consult any outside sources, such as diagnostic manuals, 
books, or colleagues in completing this survey, as this would 
defeat the survey's purpose. 
3. Because we are interested in your spontaneous reactions 
to the cases, please try not to spend more than 3 to 4 
minutes on any one case. 
Specific Instructions for Cases: 
1. On the next page you will see the personality profile of 
your first hypothetical client. Please read the entire 
profile, and then try your best to imagine this person and 
what they are like. 
2. Following the first profile is a list of the 11 
personality disorders. Next to each disorder is a 1-7 rating 
scale. Please circle only one number between 1 and 7 
corresponding to how typical or atypical the client is of EACH 
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of the 11 personality disorders. The higher the number, the 
more typical the client is of the disorder; the lower the 
number, the less typical the client is of the disorder. (Note 
that in any category, such as the category of birds, for 
example, some category members, such as robins, sparrows, and 
cardinals, are very good "classic" examples of that category. 
Other category members, however, such as ostriches, penguins, 
and turkeys, are considered more "atypical" examples of the 
bird category). 
3. After you have completed the first client's typicality 
ratings for ALL 11 personality disorders, please decide which 
single category best fits the client described in the profile. 
Indicate this by putting a check mark in the blank next to the 
category you have selected. Feel free to use the optional 
comments section to clarify any responses that you think might 
be misunderstood. 
4. After you have completed these steps for the first case, 
continue on to the remaining 7 cases. Please complete each 
of the cases one at a time, in order, and please refrain from 
returning to a case after you have begun the next one. Thank 
you again for participating. Please begin the survey. 
Sample Personality Profile 
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1. PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING PROFILE AND THINK ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO IS 
DESCRIBED. THIS INDIVIDUAL CAN BE DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: 
I — reacts intensely to separation from others 
I — unstable Interpersonal relationships 
I -- loss of appreciation for total context due to preoccupation with 
I trivia 
I — Intense, irrational, Inappropriate anger 
I — frequently overwhelmed by intense affect, either hostility or 
I depression 
! -- unable to experience pleasure; anhedonic 
I — shows impaired reality testing under stress 
I — feelings of depersonalization and derealization; sees 3elf as 
I artificial 
I — conflicting emotions of love, anger, and guilt felt towards those 
I upon whoa he/she depends 
2. For EACH of the categories listed below, please circle a number between 1 
and 7 to indicate how typical the individual is of EACH CATEGORY. 
3. After step 2, please decide which single category best describes the 
individual. Put a checkmark (•) in the blank next to the category you have 
selected. Use the optional contents section to clarify any responses you 
think might be misunderstood. 
CATEGORY TYPICALITY RATING (how well the person described 
fits each category; 7 = best fit or "classic" 
example, 1 = poorest fit or most atypical example) 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
6 — 7 
4. Consents (optional): 
WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR CHOICES FOR THIS PROFILE, PLEASE TURN THE PAGE. 
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Antisocial P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 
Avoidant P.D. 1 — 2 3 — 11 — 5 -
Borderline P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 
Dependent P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 -
Histrionic P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 -
Narcissistic P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 
Obsessive-Compulsive P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 -- 4 — 5 — 
Paranoid P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 
Passive-Aggressive P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 -
Schizoid P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 -
Schizotypal P.D. 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 -
Other (specify: ) 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 
This profile corresponds to the cell in Design 3, in 
which the category features were of high typicality, high 
dominance, and high number (see Table 13). The profile was 
intended to portray the diagnostic category of Borderline 
Personality Disorder. Seven of the eight clinicians who 
received this profile diagnosed it as Borderline Personality 
Disorder. For each profile corresponding to each of the 48 
profiles, there were four versions in which the presentation 
of the features was randomly ordered to control for sequence 
effects. Each of the four versions was received by two of the 
eight clinicians in each subcondition. 
Demographic Questionnaire 
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1. Age: 
2. Gender: 
3. Primary place of clinical work (please check one): 
Private practice 
Hospital 
Mental health clinic 
Correctional facility 
Medical school 
Other, please specify: 
4. Number of years of clinical experience: 
5. Approximate number of personality disorder cases 
you assessed in the last 6 months: 
6. (Optional) - Any specific comments or feedback about this 
this study are welcome. 
Thank you again for your participation. Please be sure to 
enclose this questionnaire and all 8 completed profiles when 
you return your data in the enclosed envelope. 
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Debriefing Letter 
Dear 
We would like to thank you for your recent participation 
in my dissertation project, in which you provided diagnoses 
and typicality ratings for several hypothetical clients. 
This letter is intended to explain the nature of the study in 
greater detail. 
Clinical diagnoses of psychopathology have often been 
viewed as a necessary evil. On the one hand, diagnostic 
categories are essential in communicating information about 
clients to other clinicians, as well as to oneself at a future 
date. Diagnoses may also provide clues to clinicians 
regarding additional features to inquire about during 
assessment, as well as clues about etiology and treatment. 
On the other hand, many clinicians feel that diagnostic 
categories are too narrow to reflect the diversity of clinical 
phenomena in the real world. A common criticism that 
clinicians have of diagnostic systems is that they invariably 
pigeon-hole individual clients into categories that do not 
completely fit. 
DSM-III-R represents a move toward a system that 
acknowledges the heterogeneity of clients diagnosed with a 
given disorder. This classification system, however, is 
still based upon the traditional classical theory of 
categorization. According to the classical theory, category 
membership is determined by the presence or absence of a set 
of necessary and sufficient criteria. Thus, an entire set of 
criteria is necessary for category membership in that no 
criteria can be missing. The set of criteria is also 
sufficient to acquire category membership in that no 
additional criteria need be fulfilled. If all members of a 
classical category possess the same set of necessary and 
sufficient criteria, it follows that all category members are 
equally good, representative instances of the category. 
Moreover, all category members are equally poor, 
unrepresentative examples of other categories. 
Classical theory has recently been challenged by 
proponents of the alternative prototype theory of 
categorization. According to prototype theory, category 
membership is not determined by a set of necessary and 
sufficient criteria. Rather, it is determined by a category 
member's degree of "family resemblance" to the category. In 
the case of Histrionic Personality Disorder, for example, one 
client may be a "classic" example of the disorder, whereas 
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another client may be an atypical example of the disorder. 
Thus, according to prototype theory, all clients diagnosed 
with a particular disorder are not equally representative of 
that disorder. Some are more prototypical than others. 
We are interested in examining how three critical factors 
interact to determine the prototypicality of individual cases 
of the personality disorders. The more prototypical a client 
is of a given disorder, the more likely he or she will be 
diagnosed with that disorder. The first factor is the 
absolute number of features associated with a given 
diagnostic category described in the case. The second factor 
is the proportion of "category" features over the total number 
of features described in the case. The third factor is the 
prototypicalitv of the individual category features described 
in the case. We varied these factors in a two (medium 
typicality vs. high typicality) by two (low dominance vs. 
high dominance) by two (low number vs. high number) factorial 
design. We predicted that the interaction between feature 
number, feature typicality, and dominance would impact 
diagnostic judgments according to the following principle. 
When the salience of one variable (or pair of variables) is 
low, then the remaining variable has a greater impact 
relative to when the salience of the first variable (or pair 
of variables) is high. For example, when the number of 
category features is low, as opposed to high, then dominance 
is predicted to have a greater impact upon the clinicians' 
j udgments. 
The results of this study may have important implications 
for identifying the processes that clinicians use in making 
diagnostic judgments. The study may help us understand how 
clinicians diagnose clients with personality disorders 
according to factors that appear to "call up" the clinicians' 
prototypes of these disorders. These decision-making 
processes could then be incorporated into the development and 
evaluation of future psychodiagnostic systems. 
Thank you again for contributing your clinical experience 
to our understanding of the personality disorders and how they 
are diagnosed. A summary of the results of the project will 
be mailed to you as soon as they are available. 
Sincerely, 
Diana L. Herbert, M.A. 
Doctoral Candidate 
Rosemery 0. Nelson, Ph.D. 
Dissertation Chairperson 
APPENDIX B 
Tables 
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Table 1 
Subject Demographic Data 
Gender 50% male (n = 16) 
50% female (n = 16) 
Age x =41.5 years 
S.D. = 8.0 years 
min =31 years 
max = 69 years 
(n = 30) 
Primary Place of 
Practice 
91% private practice 
9% hospital 
(n = 32) 
Years of Clinical 
Experience 
x =13.6 years 
S.D. = 7.6 years 
min = 4 years 
max = 34 years 
(n = 30) 
No. of Personality 
Disorder Cases 
Assessed in Past 
Six Months 
x =14.4 cases 
S.D. = 12.5 cases 
min = 2 cases 
max = 50 cases 
(n = 27) 
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Table 2 
Summary List of the Five Major Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable 1: 
typicality rating for the intended category dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the noncategory dx's 
Dependent Variable 2: 
typicality rating for the modal dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonmodal dx's 
Dependent Variable 3: 
typicality rating for the chosen dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonchosen dx's 
Dependent Variable 4: 
Number of chosen diagnoses corresponding to the intended 
diagnosis in a given condition. 
Dependent Variable 5: 
Number of chosen diagnoses corresponding to the modal 
diagnosis in a given condition. 
KEY: dx = diagnosis 
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Table 3 
Summary Chart of Experimental Results 
Measure Factor Design Combination 
1 + 3 1 + 2 2 + 3 
DV1 Typ **** **** **** 
Dom **** • **** 
Cat# - - * 
Tot# • * • 
DV2 Typ ** * ** 
Dom * • *** 
Cat# - - -
Tot# • • 
DV3 Typ - - -
Dom - • -
Cat# - - -
Tot# • • 
DV4 Typ ** ** ** 
Dom ** • ** 
Cat# - - * 
Tot# • — • 
DV5 Typ * - * 
Dom - • 4c 
Cat# - - -
Tot# • • 
KEY: **** = p < or = .0001 Typ = Typicality 
*** = p < or — .001 Dom = Dominance 
** = p < or = .01 Cat# = Category number 
* = p < or = .05 Tot# = Total number 
- = not significant For Dvl to DV5, refer to 
. = not applicable Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 1 
typicality rating for the intended category dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the noncategory dx's 
For Design Combination 1+3 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Typicality 25.51 1 31.52 0.0001 
Dominance 10.63 1 13.18 0.0001 
Category Number 0.58 1 0.72 0.097 
Typ * Dom 1.87 1 2.31 0.130 
Typ * Cat# 0.12 1 0.15 0.701 
Dom * Cat# 1.76 1 2.17 0.142 
Typ * Dom * Cat# 0.80 1 0.99 0.321 
Error 179.71 222 
Table 5 
135 
Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 1 
typicality rating for the intended category dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the noncategory dx's 
For Design Combination 1+2 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F P 
Typicality 16.92 1 26.20 0.0001 
Category Number 0.52 1 0.80 0.37 
Total Number 0.78 1 1.20 0.27 
Typ * Cat# 2.31 1 3.58 0.060 
Typ * Tot# 0.19 1 0.30 0.587 
Cat# * Tot# 1.66 1 2.58 0.110 
Typ * Cat# * Tot# 0.10 1 0.15 0.702 
Error 140.74 218 
Table 6 
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Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 1 
typicality rating for the intended category dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the noncategory dx's 
For Design Combination 2+3 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Typicality 30.90 1 39.71 0.0001 
Dominance 16.63 1 21.95 0.0001 
Category Number 4.26 1 5.62 0.019 
Typ * Dom 0.80 1 1.06 0.304 
Typ * Cat# 0.38 1 0.50 0.479 
Dom * Cat# 0.001 1 0.001 0.977 
Typ * Dom * Cat# 1.42 1 1.87 0.173 
Error 163.66 216 
Table 7 
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Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 2 
typicality rating for the modal dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonmodal dx's 
For Design Combination 1+3 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. 
Typicality 9.13 1 9.99 0.002 
Dominance 4.61 1 5.04 0.026 
Category Number 1.09 1 1.19 0.276 
Typ * Dom 1.55 1 1.69 0.196 
Typ * Cat# 0.23 1 0.25 0.618 
Dom * Cat# 0.53 1 0.58 0.448 
Typ * Dom * Cat# 1.05 1 1.15 0.285 
Error 122.53 134 
Table 8 
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Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 2 
typicality rating for the modal dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonmodal dx's 
For Design Combination 1+2 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F P 
Typicality 2.71 1 3.92 0.050 
Category Number 0.395 1 0.571 0.451 
Total Number 0.002 1 0.003 0.955 
Typ * Cat# 0.69 1 1.00 0.319 
Typ * Tot# 0.12 1 0.18 0.674 
Cat# * Tot# 1.07 1 1.55 0.216 
Typ * Cat# * Tot# 0.005 1 0.01 0.935 
Error 93.93 136 
Table 9 
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Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 2 
typicality rating for the modal dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonmodal dx's 
For Design Combination 2+3 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F P 
Typicality 8.68 1 9.85 0.002 
Dominance 10.88 1 12.34 0.001 
Category Number 0.02 1 0.24 0.877 
Typ * Dom 2.13 1 2.42 0.122 
Typ * Cat# 0.04 1 0.04 0.837 
Dom * Cat# 2.68 1 3.04 0.083 
Typ * Dom * Cat# 1.51 1 1.71 0.193 
Error 135.72 154 
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Table 10 
Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 3 
typicality rating for the chosen dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonchosen dx's 
For Design Combination 1+3 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Typicality 1.98 1 2.06 0.152 
Dominance 1.66 1 1.73 0.190 
Category Number 0.39 1 0.413 0.521 
Typ * Dom 0.31 1 0.33 0.568 
Typ * Cat# 0.01 1 0.01 0.928 
Dom * Cat# 0.67 1 0.70 0.405 
Typ * Dom * Cat# 0.09 1 0.10 0.757 
Error 206.99 216 
Table 11 
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Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 3 
typicality rating for the chosen dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonchosen dx's 
For Design Combination 1+2 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F P 
Typicality 0.44 1 0.52 0.474 
Category Number 0.004 1 0.004 0.948 
Total Number 0.12 1 0.13 0.715 
Typ * Cat# 0.40 1 0.47 0.493 
Typ * Tot# 1.81 1 2.12 0.147 
Cat# * Tot# 0.02 1 0.02 0.891 
Typ * Cat# * Tot# 0.20 1 0.24 0.628 
Error 180.79 211 
Table 12 
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Three-Way Analysis of Variance on Dependent Variable 3 
typicality rating for the chosen dx 
mean of the typicality ratings for the nonchosen dx's 
For Design Combination 2+3 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Typicality 0.005 0.005 0.945 
Dominance 0.78 0.80 0.372 
Category Number 0.57 0.58 0.446 
Typ * Dom 0.61 0.62 0.431 
Typ * Cat# 0.11 0.11 0.736 
Dom * Cat# 0.45 0.47 0.495 
Typ * Dom * Cat# 0. 55 0.56 0.453 
Error 201.84 207 
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Table 13 
Number of Chosen Diagnoses Matching the Intended 
and Modal Diagnosis for Each Subcondition 
LO DOM LO DOM HI DOM 
LO TOTAL# HI TOTAL# LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# 
i l 
MED 
TYP 
HI 
TYP 
AO-OC4 
B0-SD3 
H4==H4 
NO-OC2$ 
AO-OC4 
B2 
H5==H5 
N2 
A1 
BO—— 
HI—N3# 
N1-PR3 
A2 
B2 
H3 
N4==N4 
AO 
B0-DY3 
H2-SD4 
N0-PR3 
A1-SD4 
B1 
H2—B3 
N5==N5 
. I l 
I I 
A0-PR3 
B1-OC4 
HO—N2# 
N2==N2# 
A2 # 
B4==B4 
H4==H4 
N3==N3 
T 
A2 
B0-DY2# 
HI—N2 
N2 
A7=—A7 
B1-PS2 
H3==H3 
N6==N6# 
l l. 
A5==A5 
B1-DP6 
H3==H3 
N1 
A6==A6 
B7—=B7 
H6==H6 
N5==N5 
DESIGN 1 DESIGN 2 DESIGN 3 
Each of the four subconditions within each cell presents the 
following information in the following order: the intended 
diagnosis, the number of chosen diagnoses that matched the 
intended diagnosis, the modal diagnosis if one occurred, and 
the number of chosen diagnoses that matched the modal 
diagnosis. There was a maximum of eight possible matching 
chosen diagnoses in each subcondition. Due to missing data, 
however, six of the 48 subconditions had only seven valid 
cases (indicated by a "if"), and one subconditon had only six 
valid cases (indicated by a "$") . The 13 underlined 
subconditions are those in which the chosen diagnoses (a) 
matched the intended diagnosis, and (b) were agreed upon by 
at least half of the clinicians in that subcondition. 
A = Antisocial 
B = Borderline 
H = Histrionic 
N = Narcissistic 
OC = Obsessive-compulsisve PD 
PR = Paranoid PD 
DY = Dysthymic Disorder or "Depressive PD" 
SD = Schizoid PD 
PS = Passive-aggressive PD 
DP = Dependent PD 
Table 14 
Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Intended Diagnoses for Each Condition 
LO DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO DOM 
HI TOTAL# 
HI DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# 
! | I I I I I I 
MED 4 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
5 10 
TYP 1 1 1 1 
13% 13% 6% 10% 16% 31% 
(n=30) (n=31)j 
1 
|(n=31) 
l 
(n=30)j 
i 
|(n=30) (n=32) 
HI 9 
1 
1 
1 
11 
1 
1 
1 
9 
1 
1 
1 
13 
1 
1 
1 
17 24 
TYP 1 1 1 j 1 
28% 34% 8% 13% 55% 75% 
(n=32) (n=32)| I(n=32) (n=31)j j(n=30) (n=31)j 
.1 I. . 1  I .  
DESIGN 1 DESIGN 2 DESIGN 3 
= # of valid cases out of 32 possible cases per cell. 
Table 15 
Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Intended Diagnosis Collapsed Across 
Designs 1 and 3 
LO AND HI DOM COLLAPSED 
LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
MED 
TYP 
(n=60) 
13 
(n=63) 
HI 
TYP 
26 
(n=62) 
35 
(n=63) 
- § of valid cases out of 64 possible cases per cell 
Table 16 
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Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Intended Diagnosis Collapsed Across 
Designs 1 and 2 
LO DOM 
LO AND HI TOTAL# COLLAPSED 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
MED 
TYP 
(n=61) (n=61) 
HI 
TYP 
18 
(n=64) 
24 
(n=63) 
n = # of valid cases out of 64 possible cases per cell. 
Table 17 
Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Intended Diagnosis Collapsed Across 
Designs 2 and 3 
LO AND HI DOM COLLAPSED 
LO AND HI TOTAL# COLLAPSED 
MED 
TYP 
HI 
TYP 
LO CAT# 
(n=61) 
26 
(n=62) 
HI CAT# 
13 
(n=62) 
37 
(n=62) 
= # of valid cases out of 64 possible cases per cell 
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Table 18 
McNemar Tests on Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Intended Diagnosis 
for Typicality 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 3 
HI TYP 
incorrect correct 
MED 
TYP 
correct 
incorrect 
A 
10 
52 
B 
12 
47 
X = 22.74 
p < .001 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 2 
MED 
TYP 
HI TYP 
incorrect correct 
!A 
correct 
incorrect 
10 
72 
B 
D 
37 
X = 14.38 
p < .001 
Design 
Combination 
2 + 3 
MED 
TYP 
HI TYP 
incorrect correct 
i 
correct 
incorrect 52 
B 
14 
48 
X = 31.13 
p < .001 
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Table 19 
McNemar Tests on Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Intended Diagnosis 
for Dominance 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 3 
HI DOM 
incorrect correct 
LO 
DOM 
i 
correct 
incorrect 57 
B 
17 
37 
X = 15.85 
p < .001 
Design 
Combination 
2 + 3 
MED 
DOM 
correct 
incorrect 
HI DOM 
incorrect correct 
54 42 
X = 16.98 
p < .001 
I I 
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Table 20 
McNemar Tests on Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Intended Diagnosis 
for Category Feature Number 
Design HI CAT# 
Combination 
1 + 3  i n c o r r e c t  c o r r e c t  
|A ! B 
correct 1 
1 
17 1 
1 17 
LO 1 i 
1 
I 
AT# c |D 
incorrect 1 
1 
1 
1 
59 1 
1 
1 
I 
27 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 2 
HI CAT# 
incorrect correct 
LO 
CAT# 
correct 
incorrect 
14 
72 
B 
8 
22 
X = 1.36 
p = n.s. 
Design 
Combination 
2 + 3 
HI CAT# 
incorrect correct 
B 
LO 
CAT# 
correct 
incorrect 
11 
60 
21 
27 
X = 5.92 
p < . 02 
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Table 21 
McNemar Tests on Number of "Correct" Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Intended Diagnosis 
for Total Number of Features 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 2 
LO 
TOT# 
HI TOT# 
incorrect correct 
correct 
incorrect 
20 
74 
B 
21 
X = 0, df =1 
p = n.s. 
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Table 22 
Number of Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Modal Diagnoses in Each Condition 
LO DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO DOM 
HI TOTAL# 
HI DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# 
I l i i i i I i i 
MED 13 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
10 
1 
1 
11 
1 
1 
4 14 
TYP 1 | 1 i 1 j 1 j 
43% 19% 31% 37% 13% 44% 
(n=30) (n=31)j 
1 
j (n=32) 
1 
(n=30)j 
1 
j(n=31) 
i 
(n=32)j 
HI 9 
1 
1 
1 
4 ! 
1 
1 
1 
12 
1 
1 
1 
11 
1 
1 
1 
18 2 4  
TYP 1 1 1 1 j 
28% 13% 38% 35% 58% 75% 
(n=32) (n=32)j j(n=32) (n=31)j |(n=31) (n=32) 
. 1  l .  .1 l. 
DESIGN 1 DESIGN 2 DESIGN 3 
n = # of chosen diagnoses per cell. The maximum n per 
condition is 32, corresponding to the eight clinicians 
within that condition who were asked to diagnosis each 
of the four hypothetical clients associated with each 
intended diagnosis. 
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Table 23 
Number of Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Modal Diagnosis Collapsed Across 
Designs 1 and 3 
LO AND HI DOM COLLAPSED 
LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
1 
1 
1 
MED 17 20 
TYP 
1 
1 
1 
(n=40) (n=38) 
1 
1 
1 
HI 27 28 
TYP 
1 
1 
l 
(n=3 6) (n=39) 
n = # of valid cases out of 64 possible cases per cell 
Table 24 
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Number of Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Modal Diagnosis Collapsed Across 
Designs 1 and 2 
LO DOM 
LO AND HI TOTAL# COLLAPSED 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
MED 
TYP 
23 
(n=49) 
17 
(n=45) 
HI 
TYP 
21 
(n=38) 
15 
(n=32) 
n = # of valid cases out of 64 possible cases per cell 
Table 25 
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Number of Chosen Diagnoses Matching the 
Modal Diagnosis Collapsed Across 
Designs 2 and 3 
LO AND HI DOM COLLAPSED 
LO AND HI TOTAL# COLLAPSED 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
MED 
TYP 
14 
(n=35) 
25 
(n=53) 
HI 
TYP 
30 
(n=44) 
35 
(n=55) 
n = # of valid cases out of 64 possible cases per cell 
Table 26 
McNemar Tests on Number of Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Modal Diagnosis 
for Typicality 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 3 
HI TYP 
incorrect correct 
i 
MED 
TYP 
correct 
incorrect 14 
B 
19 
15 
X = 4.05 
p < . 05 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 2 
HI TYP 
incorrect correct 
i 
MED 
TYP 
correct 
incorrect 19 
B 
13 
14 
X = 1.71 
p = n.s. 
Design 
Combination 
2 + 3 
HI TYP 
incorrect correct 
correct 
|A 
1 
6 
IB 
1 
24 
MED 1 1 
1 
| 
TYP 
incorrect 
C 
1 
1 
19 |
D 
1 
1 
19 
X = 5.76 
p < . 02 
Table 27 
McNemar Tests on Number of Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Modal Diagnosis 
for Dominance 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 3 
HI DOM 
incorrect correct 
LO 
DOM 
i 
correct 
incorrect 
B 
10 
11 
X = 0.94 
p = n.s. 
Design 
Combination 
2 + 3 
HI DOM 
incorrect correct 
MED 
DOM 
correct 
incorrect 
X = 4.97 
p < .05 
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Table 28 
McNemar Tests on Number of Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Modal Diagnosis 
for Category Feature Number 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 3 
HI CAT# 
incorrect correct 
A 
LO 
CAT# 
correct 
incorrect 13 
B 
19 
10 
X = 0.23 
p = n.s. 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 2 
LO 
CAT# 
HI CAT# 
incorrect correct 
r 
correct 
incorrect 
12 
20 
B 
16 
D 
X = 0.19 
p = n.s. 
Design 
Combination 
2 + 3 
LO 
CAT# 
HI CAT# 
incorrect correct 
correct 
incorrect 
11 
19 
B 
25 
9 
X = 0.05 
p = n.s. 
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Table 29 
McNemar Tests on Number of Chosen Diagnoses 
Matching the Modal Diagnosis 
for Total Number of Features 
Design 
Combination 
1 + 2 
HI TOT# 
incorrect correct 
LO 
TOT# 
correct 
incorrect 
X = 0.21 
p = n.s. 
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Table 30 
Number and Percentage of Chosen Diagnoses Within Each 
Condition that Matched the Intended Diagnosis And 
Were Agreed Upon by at Least Half of The 
Clinicians in Each Subcondition 
LO DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO DOM 
HI TOTAL# 
HI DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# LO CAT# HI CAT# 
! I I I I I l l I 
MED 4 
1 
1 
o 
1 
1 
o 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
o 5 
TYP 1 1 1 | 1 j 
13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 
(n=30) (n=31)j 
1 
| (11=32) 
I 
(n=30)j 
1 
1(n=31) 
i 
(n=32) 
HI 5 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
8 
1 
1 
1 
13 2 4  
TYP 1 1 1 1 
16% 13% 16% 26% 42% 75% 
(n=32) (n=32)j j(n=32) (n=31)j |(n=31) (n=32) 
DESIGN 1 DESIGN 2 DESIGN 3 
n = # of chosen diagnoses per cell. The maximum n per 
condition is 32, corresponding to the eight clinicians within 
that condition who were asked to diagnosis each of the four 
hypothetical clients associated with each intended diagnosis. 
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Table 31 
Summary Chart Comparing the Results Using the -7 to +7 
Measure with the Results Using the Proportion Measure 
Measure Factor Design Combination 
1 + 3  1 + 2  2  +  3  
DV1 Typ *** *** **** 
-7 to +7 Dom *** • *** 
Cat# - - * 
Tot# • — • 
DV1 Typ **** * * X * **** 
Propor. Dom **** • **** 
Cat# - - * 
Tot# • - • 
DV2 
-7 to +7 
DV2 
Propor. 
Typ 
Dom 
Cat# 
Tot# 
Typ 
Dom 
Cat# 
Tot# 
***** 
***** 
***** 
** 
* 
***** 
**** 
***** 
**** 
***** 
** 
*** 
***** = p < or = .00001 
**** = p < or = .0001 
*** = p < or = .001 
** = p < or = .01 
* = p < or = .05 
- = not significant 
• 
= not applicable 
DV1 = Measure using intended diagnosis. 
DV2 = Measure using modal diagnosis. 
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LO DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
I 
MED 
TYP 1 3 
3 9 
HI 
TYP 1 3 
3 9 
I I 
DESIGN 1 
LO DOM 
HI TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
I l l 
2 
1 1 
1 1 
! _e ! 
6 18 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
2 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
! _6 ! 
6 18 
i i 
i i 
1 1 
DESIGN 2 
HI DOM 
LO TOTAL# 
LO CAT# HI CAT# 
i I 
2 
1 1 
1 1 
! © ! 
3 9 
i i 
i i i i 
2 
1 1 
i i 
i i 
! 6 | 
3 9 
1 1 
1 1 
i 1 1 
DESIGN 3 
KEY: Low Dominance proportion = 1/3 
High Dominance proportion = 2/3 
Within each cell, 
Numerator = # of Category Features 
Denominator = # of Total Features 
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The -7 to +7 Dependent Variable with Corresponding Results 
Boykin (1987) used a dependent variable that combined 
accuracy and typicality by assigning a positive value to the 
1-7 typicality ratings of accurate diagnoses, and a negative 
value to the 1-7 typicality ratings of inaccurate diagnoses. 
Thus, an inaccurate diagnosis with the highest possible rating 
of 7 would be represented as a single data point of -7, 
whereas an accurate diagnosis with the highest possible rating 
of 7 would be represented as a single data point of +7. Given 
its range from -7 to +7, this dependent variable will 
henceforth be referred to as the -7 to +7 measure. The 
accuracy of the diagnosis chosen by each clinician was 
determined by its correspondence with the intended diagnosis, 
that is, with the diagnostic category that each profile was 
intended to describe. In addition to a discussion of the -
7 to +7 measure, this appendix includes the experimental 
results of the present study using the -7 to +7 dependent 
measure. 
In the present study, the -7 to +7 measure was judged to 
be somewhat incompatible with the prototype model of 
categorization. This dependent veasure places the inaccurate 
diagnosis on a -7 to +7 continuum with the correct diagnosis, 
suggesting that the more correct or typical a given diagnosis 
is (e.g., Borderline), then the less accurate or typical 
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another diagnosis must be (e.g., Histrionic) . More consistent 
with the prototype model of psychodiagnosis is the assumption 
that two forms of psychopathology, such as the two personality 
disorders cited above, are not mutually exclusive; they can 
be considered along two different continua, such that a 
personality profile may be equally reflective of both 
disorders. In the present study, a measure judged to be more 
compatible with the prototype model was used, as discussed in 
Chapter III. Unlike the -7 to +7 measure, the alternative 
measure devised examined the clinician's typicality rating for 
the chosen diagnosis within the greater context of that 
clinician's typicality ratings for the other personality 
disorder diagnoses that were not chosen. 
Two Dependent Variables Based Upon the -7 to +7 Measure 
In order that the present results could be compared with 
earlier studies that employed the -7 to +7 measure, two 
variations of this dependent measure were created. The first 
variable was created using the intended diagnosis as the 
standard for comparison, whereas the second variable used the 
modal diagnosis as the standard for comparison. For the first 
variable, a positive value was assigned to the 1-7 typicality 
ratings of the diagnoses that corresponded to the intended 
diagnosis, and a negative value was assigned to the 1-7 
typicality ratings of diagnoses that did not correspond to the 
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intended diagnosis. This resulted in an "accuracy-typicality 
score" for each diagnosis chosen by the clinicians. For the 
second variable, a positive value was assigned to the 1-7 
typicality ratings of the chosen diagnoses when they 
corresponded to the modal diagnosis, and a negative value was 
assigned to the 1-7 typicality ratings of the chosen diagnoses 
when they did not correspond to the modal diagnosis. This 
resulted in a "reliability-prototypicality score" for each 
diagnosis chosen by the clinicians. 
Results 
The -7 to +7 data were bimodally distributed, thereby 
violating the required assumptions for parametric statistics. 
Therefore, a nonparametric test was used. The Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test was judged to be the most 
appropriate nonparametric test for two related samples of 
ordinal data (Segal, 1956). 
For each dependent variable, separate analyses were 
performed for the three different combinations of designs (1 
+3, 1+2, and 2+3). For each analysis, the data for the 
four cells corresponding to a given condition, such as high 
typicality, were combined and then ranked. 
The -7 to +7 Dependent Measure Using the Intended 
Diagnosis as the Standard of Comparison. When the intended 
diagnosis was used as the standard for determining the 
168 
accuracy of the chosen diagnosis, the clinician's chosen 
diagnoses were associated with significantly higher accuracy-
prototypical ity scores when the intended category features of 
the hypothetical client were of high typicality compared to 
when they were of medium typicality. The z-scores and p 
values corresponding to each design combination are as 
follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, z = -3.70, p = .0002; 
Design Combination 1+2, z = -3.56, p = .0004; 
Design Combination 2+3, z = -4.03, p= .0001. 
Across both of the two design combinations that included 
dominance as a factor (1 + 3 and 2 + 3) , a main effect for 
dominance was revealed. The clinician's chosen diagnosis were 
associated with a significantly higher accuracy-
prototypical ity score when the category features represented 
a highly dominant proportion of all the features presented 
relative to when the category features represented a less 
dominant proportion of all the features presented. The z-
scores and p values for the dominance main effects are as 
follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, z = -3.54, p< .0004; 
Design Combination 2+3, z = -3.39, p< .0007. 
A main effect for the number of category features was 
revealed only for Design Combination 2 + 3. For this 
combination of designs, the subject's chosen diagnoses were 
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associated with significantly higher accuracy-prototypicality 
scores when the profile contained a high number of category 
features, compared to when the profile contained a low number 
of category features (z = -1.95, p = .0507). No main effects 
for category feature number were revealed for Design 
C o m b i n a t i o n  1 + 3 ,  n o r  f o r  D e s i g n  C o m b i n a t i o n  1 + 2  ( z  =  
-1.1562, p = .2476; and z = -0.8947, p = .3709, respectively). 
Consistent with predictions, no main effect was revealed for 
total feature number, which was included as an experimental 
control variable in Design Combination 2+3 (z = -0.1402, p 
= 0.8885). 
The -7 to +7 Dependent Measure Using the Modal Diagnosis 
as the Standard of Comparison. Across all three Design 
Combinations (1 + 3, 1 + 2, and 2 + 3) , the Wilcoxon tests 
revealed a main effect for feature typicality. As predicted, 
the clinician's chosen diagnoses were associated with 
significantly higher reliability-prototypicality scores when 
the features in the profile were of high typicality, compared 
to when the features were of medium typicality. The z-scores 
and p values for the typicality main effects are as follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, z = -4.94, p < .00001; 
Design Combination 1+2, z = -4.86, p< .00001; 
Design Combination 2+3, z = -4.86, p< .00001. 
Across both design combinations that included dominance 
as a factor (1 + 3 and 2 + 3) , a main effect for dominance was 
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revealed. The clinicians' chosen diagnoses were associated 
with significantly higher reliability-prototypicality scores 
when the category features represented a highly dominant 
proportion of all the features presented relative to when the 
category features represented a less dominant proportion of 
all the features presented. The z-scores and p values for the 
dominance main effects are as follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, z = -4.18, p = .00001; 
Design Combination 2+3, z = -3.81, p = .0001. 
Finally, across all three design combinations, a main 
effect for the number of category features was revealed. 
Subject's chosen diagnoses were associated with significantly 
higher reliability-prototypicality scores when the profile 
contained a high number of category features, compared to when 
the profile contained a low number of category features. The 
z-scores and p values corresponding to each of the design 
combinations are as follows: 
Design Combination 1+3, z = -4.31, p< .00001; 
Design Combination 1+2, z = -3.83, p< .0001; 
Design Combination 2+3, z = -4.06, p < .00001. 
Consistent with predictions, no main effect was revealed for 
total feature number, which was included as an experimental 
control variable in Design Combination 2+3 (z = -0.1568, 
p = 0.8754). 
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Comparison of Results Using Other Dependent Variables. 
A summary chart comparing the experimental results using the 
-7 to +7 measure with the results using the proportion measure 
is presented in Table 31. When the intended diagnosis was 
the standard, analyses of the two types of dependent measures 
yielded a similar pattern of results. In this context, 
however, the proportion dependent variable was associated with 
more significant results relative to the -7 to +7 dependent 
variable. 
When the modal diagnosis was examined, analyses of the 
two types of dependent measures also revealed a similar 
pattern of results. Within this context, analyses performed 
on the -7 to +7 measure yielded more significant results than 
did those performed on the proportion measure. Additionally, 
whereas analyses on the proportion dependent measure revealed 
no significant effects for category feature number, analyses 
on the +7 to -7 dependent measure yielded a highly significant 
main effect for category feature number across all three 
design combinations. 
Note that whereas the proportion dependent variable 
examined the prototypical ity of the intended or modal 
diagnosis in the context of the prototypical ity of the other 
diagnoses, the -7 to +7 measure examined the prototypicality 
of only the intended or modal diagnosis in isolation. The 
most likely explanation of the discrepancy in the effects of 
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category feature number on the proportion measure vs. the -
7 to +7 measure rests on the fact that the latter measure does 
not take into account the ratings made of the nontarget 
diagnoses. It appears that although category feature number 
did influence the ratings of the modal diagnosis, this factor 
also had a corresponding similar influence on the ratings of 
the nonmodal diagnoses. When ratings of the modal diagnosis 
are examined in isolation, they appear to vary as a function 
of the number of category features presented. When these 
ratings are adjusted to take into account the overall ratings 
made of the other diagnoses, however, this effect disappears. 
Thus, the results of the proportion and the -7 to +7 
dependent variables are quite similar across the majority of 
the analyses conducted. The discrepancies that do occur, 
however, illustrate the weakness of the -7 to +7 measure, and 
underscore the importance of considering prototypicality 
ratings of a target item in the context of corresponding 
ratings of other items. 
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In preparation for each McNemar test, each subject's two 
observations corresponding to the two levels of a given 
factor, within each level of the other factors, were paired 
together. A 2 by 2 matrix, such as that depicted below, was 
then constructed for each test. 
HI TYP 
incorrect correct 
iB ! 
correct 1 
1 
1 1 
1 1 
MED 1 i 
1 1 
i i 
TYP |C |D ! 
incorrect 1 
1 
1 
i 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
X = R(A - D) - 11 
A + D 
d.f. = 1 
This matrix resulted in four cells that represented the four 
possible outcomes of the paired observations given the 
possibility of either correct or incorrect diagnoses for one 
or both levels of the factor in question. The paired 
obseirvations were then represented as a single data point and 
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categorized into one of four cells, as illustrated in the 
following example comparing medium versus high typicality: 
Cell A - the number of paired observations in which the 
diagnosis in the medium typicality condition was correct, but 
the corresponding diagnosis in the high typicality condition 
was incorrect; 
Cell B - the number of paired observations in which the 
diagnosis in the medium typicality condition was correct and 
the corresponding diagnosis in the high typicality condition 
was correct; 
Cell C - the number of paired observations in which the 
diagnosis in the medium typicality condition was incorrect, 
and the corresponding diagnosis for the high typicality 
condition was incorrect; 
Cell D - the number of paired observations in which the 
diagnosis in the medium typicality condition was incorrect, 
but the corresponding diagnosis in the high typicality 
condition was correct. 
The formula for calculating the chi-square statistic for 
the McNemar test is presented above (Segal, 1956). For each 
design combination, a McNemar test compared the number of 
cases in Cell A versus Cell D under the null hypothesis that 
there were no differences in the number of cases in each cell. 
When typicality was analyzed, for example, there were 
significantly more cases in Cell D than in Cell A. That is, 
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compared with the number of paired observations in Cell A, 
there was a significantly greater number of paired 
observations in which the subject's chosen diagnosis in the 
medium typicality condition was incorrect, but the that 
subject's corresponding chosen diagnosis in the high 
typicality condition was correct. Thus, as predicted, the 
clinicians were significantly more likely to give diagnoses 
that corresponded to the intended diagnosis when the features 
of the hypothetical client were of high typicality, relative 
to when they were of medium typicality. A further discussion 
of the results of the McNemar tests is presented in Chapter 
III. 
